Good Bye Blue Collar?

A Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis of Social Democratic Voters in Western-Europe

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Abstract

Social democratic parties (SDPs) in Western Europe are undergoing turbulent times. From being among the largest and most influential political parties after WWII, in recent times they have been struggling with a constant drop in their rates of electoral support. In this thesis I have therefore investigated which groups in society still support SDPs and what the motivations behind this choice are. The analysis shows that someone who is lower-educated, belongs to the working class, has a reasonably protected job and has a positive attitude towards cultural liberalism, European integration as well as immigration, will be the most likely to vote for SDPs. For SDPs, this implies that the years to come will be probably very difficult as well. The size of the working class has strongly declined over the last years, the labour market is becoming increasingly flexible, the European project has been under a vast amount of critique and the refugee crisis has strongly polarised Western European societies.

Key words: Social democracy, class voting, insiders and outsiders, integration-demarcation, populism, multilevel regression analysis.

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List of abbreviations

SDP……Social Democratic Party

PRRP……Populist Radical Right Party

Chapter 1: Introduction

Social Democratic Parties (SDPs) are amongst the oldest and well-researched political parties in Western Europe (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2011). Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, a great deal of literature was written about these parties mainly because the 1960s and early 1970s are often seen as the golden decades of social democracy (Kitschelt, 1994). In the 1980s and 1990s, SDPs had to deal with a substantial decline in their electoral support. As a result, the 'Third Way'-movement emerged. The Third Way was a strategy to turn the tides by breaking with social democracy's traditional reputation on welfare, holding a more neoliberal position (Giddens, 1998). However, the Third Way did not show its intended effects on electoral support over a longer time (Bradford, 2002). Calculated over 16 European countries, the average decline in electoral support for SDPs since the 1950s up to 2009 was almost 5.5 percentage point (see figure 1.1).



Figure 1.1: Mean electoral support for SDPs in Western Europe, 1950-2009
Source: Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2011, 241).

The Third Way received significant scholarly attention in the late 1990s. Yet, after the 2000s the academic debate on mainstream parties, including SDPs, became less salient. In recent years few scholars have analysed the composition of SDPs' electorate. Against this background, this thesis will focus on who votes on SDPs by testing several theories which can tell us something about people's motivations to do so in Western Europe over the period 2002-2014. Both political demand side and supply side factors will be taken into account. These factors will be analysed using a quantitative, large-N research approach.

From the perspective of scientific relevance, there are three main reasons that support the focus on SDPs and social democratic voters. First, as noted in the previous paragraph, although much has been written about SDPs in Western Europe, in recent history these parties and their constituencies have received lesser scholarly attention. Furthermore, most studies that do focus on SDPs use case-studies which only deal with a single or a few European countries. Consequently, large-N comparative studies can hardly be found.

Second, current research on SDPs pays surprisingly little attention to social democratic voters. Historically it is assumed that class politics plays a crucial role in providing SDPs with their electoral support (Przeworksi and Sprague, 1986). Nevertheless, there is also evidence that the political significance of social class is generally declining (Clark, Lipset & Rempel 1993; Jansen 2011). It has become questionable to what extent class politics is still useful for understanding who votes for SDPs. Additionally, there are also several other theories that could explain why people vote or do not vote for SDPs. For example, the insider-outsider theory argues that the

political behaviour of insiders and outsiders in the labour market is crucial for determining who will vote for SDPs (Lindvall and Rueda, 2014).

In contrast to the foregoing theories, the integration-demarcation theory rejects the traditional one-dimensional worker-owner cleavage conception, and holds that cultural issues such as immigration and citizenship have become much more important for voters (Kriesi et al., 2012). Furthermore, a consequence of this development has been the rise of populist parties. These populist parties have demonstrated to be able to gain votes from groups in society that are seen as the traditional supporters of SDPs (Bale et al., 2010).

Although these theories all seem to contribute to our understanding of social democratic voters, up to now no one has analysed them integrally. Therefore, in this thesis these theories will be weighed against each other to get a better idea of why people vote for SDPs and how party positions can influence people's decision to vote for SDPs.

Third, according to Clark and Lipset (1991), scholars who study mass political behaviour often forget to look at the political supply side when analysing voting behaviour. A (recent) structured analysis of SDPs' demand and supply side politics can hardly be found in the literature. Consequently, both sides will be analysed to explain how they can affect the electoral support for SDPs.

In addition to the scientific relevance, it is important to show the societal relevance of this thesis as well. In a representative democracy, voting is the principal instrument for citizens to participate in politics. During elections, people can endorse the parties or politicians that fit the best with people's beliefs about how the country should be governed. Without this potential for choosing representatives, a state could not be considered to be a democracy. Keeping that in mind, it is essential to understand

why people vote by studying voting behaviour. Moreover, despite the decline in electoral support for SDPs, they remain to be amongst the most important party families in Western European politics. In April 2016, in ten of the eighteen Western European countries of interest, SDPs were included in the government cabinet. This implies that when looking at social democratic voters, we are actually dealing with a significant group in Western European electorates. It also means that SDPs are still very influential for executive politics which makes it crucial to do research on them. Being able to explain who votes for SDPs and more importantly why people vote for SDPs, furthers our understanding about voting behaviour and how this is influenced by both people's own beliefs and viewpoints (demand side factors) and political party positions (supply side factors).

In the former paragraphs I have mentioned several theories that can explain why people vote for SDPs and how these voters can be characterised. In the following ones I will introduce these theories briefly to make it clear what they can offer and where the empirical and theoretical gaps are located. As I will argue in the theoretical chapter, these theories share a common starting position which is rational choice theory. In short, all of the theories assume that people will vote for those parties that can represent their interests the best. These interests are given by their personal preferences. However, as I will argue, the theories fundamentally differ in that they perceive different preferences to be crucial for voting on SDPs.

Class voting is essentially based on the assumption that citizens will only vote for the parties that represent their specific class. The traditional electorate of left-wing parties is the working class, often referred to as 'blue-collar workers'. On the other hand, the non-working class will vote for right-wing parties (Jansen, 2011). Thus, in analysing

social democratic voter characteristics, it is generally assumed that the working class is the primary constituency of SDPs.

However, over the last fifty years, scholars have increasingly shown that categorizing society in basically two social classes (workers/non-workers) does not correspond with the reality in Western European post-industrial societies. As a result, more detailed class schemes have been developed (ibid., 2011). Together with this development, it has been recognised that SDPs have increasingly become catch-all parties through their efforts of attracting a proportion of the non-worker voters, the middle class voters (often referred to as 'white-collar workers') as well (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2011). Thus, according to the class voting school, SDPs have two separate electorates: the working class and the middle class.

Yet, it has been argued that this extended electoral appeal to the middle class has caught SDPs in a dilemma regarding their position on economic issues. If SDPs take in an interventionist position to protect the working class from the negative consequences of the market, they will lose the middle class. On the other hand, if they occupy a more neo-liberal position to provide more freedom to the market, it is claimed that they will lose their traditional working class voters (Grande, 2012). This dilemma is not a new one. Already in the 1980s, Przeworksi and Sprague (1986) argued that socialist and other leftist parties have to face a dilemma as a result of their traditional constituency, the working class. If parties try to attract voters from other societal groups, they risk losing workers' support. Yet, if they confine themselves to workers alone, they will lose votes as well. Following this theory, people vote for SDPs because it reflects their economic preferences stemming from the social class they belong to.

Because of this expansion of SDPs' constituency, SDPs have increasingly received support from other classes than the working class. At the same time working class

voters have become less loyal to SDPs. Over the years several scholars have therefore opposed an emphasis on social class. They argue that class politics is 'dead' and that it does not have an effect on party choice anymore. This claim seems a bit excessive to other scholars. Jansen (2011) demonstrates that although class voting is indeed in decline, social class maintains a part of its effect on party choice. However, as a result of the declining magnitude of the social class effect, it is necessary to assess other theories that might deal with social democratic voters as well.

The insider-outsider theory, developed by Rueda (2005), like the class politics theory, also states that SDPs are caught in a dilemma. Nevertheless, Rueda argues that not social class is crucial for understanding party choice, but the fact that one is an insider or outsider. Insiders are workers who enjoy a high level of employment protection, outsiders are those workers who enjoy only low levels of employment protection or are unemployed. When SPDs take in a party position that is favourable to insiders, they will lose the electoral support of outsiders and vice versa. Thus, in contrast to the class voting school, the insider-outsider theory argues that people's position on the labour market constitutes a dilemma for SDPs.

It is important to understand that social class and the insider-outsider distinction are two different issues. For determining one's social class many factors can play a role, whereas if someone is an insider or an outsider mostly depends on one's employment status. It would be wrong to think that a working class person is automatically an outsider, as the working class is split up by insiders and outsiders (Lindvall and Rueda, 2014). Therefore, the insider-outsider distinction cross-cuts through social class.

Both the class politics theory and the insider-outsider theory depart from a position which perceives economic affairs to dominate party choice. At the same time, it is argued by Grande and Kriesi (2012) that although welfare state issues remain the

most salient in politics, cultural issues such as European integration, immigration and security have increased in saliency since the 1970s due to the process of globalization. Therefore, these scholars claim that this has led to the replacement of the 'left-right' cleavage by a new one: the 'integration-demarcation cleavage'. On the demarcation side the 'losers' of the globalisation process can be found, on the integration end the 'winners'. The globalisation winners are those who have a good chance to improve their conditions by new opportunities offered through globalisation, while the globalisation losers are those who see their personal situation threatened by this process. All in all, this theory implies that it can be expected that cultural issues will be increasingly important for voters to support SDPs. We know from Dolezal and Hutter (2012) that individual positions towards cultural issues have an effect on the probability of voting for SDPs. Yet, there is little research done on how SDPs' positions on cultural issues affect the electoral support for these parties.

The growing salience of cultural issues is also closely related to the rise of populist parties in recent years. It has been argued by several scholars that these populist parties have started to increasingly appeal to the traditional constituency of left-wing parties over the past years on the basis of cultural issues (Bale et al., 2010; Kitschelt, 2004; De Lange, 2007; Meret and Siim, 2013). From a focus on the Nordic region, Meret and Siim (2013) state that right-wing populist parties with a combination of pro-welfare positions, anti-immigration politics and cultural nativist positions have explicitly tried to win traditional supporters of SDPs for them. However, little is known about how this situation relates to developments in other European countries, and thus to what extent populist parties really pose a challenge to SDPs in Western Europe.

In summary, it can be expected that SDPs are facing multiple dilemmas. They can rely less on the groups who have been their traditional supporters and they have to deal

more with new issues that have become salient in contemporary post-industrial societies. The working class, which once constituted an unequivocal source of social democratic support, is seeing its connection with SDPs weaken and the overall effect of class voting is in decline anyway. By appealing to the insiders on the labour market they reach a major group, but possibly alienate the outsiders. Additionally, the increasing saliency of cultural issues and the rise of populist parties have provided SDPs with even bigger worries. Nevertheless, how these theoretical assumptions hold in the empirical reality and more importantly, how the assumptions hold when they are integrated in one theoretical approach has not been researched. Therefore this is exactly what will be investigated in this thesis.

Yet, in order to meaningfully explain the electoral support for SDPs, it is necessary to look at the actual recent levels of electoral support for SDPs. In the beginning of this introduction I have showed how this support has developed over the last fifty years. This thesis is however interested in the situation in more recent years which requires an image that is more up to date. Therefore, the following descriptive question will be answered in this thesis:

How did the electoral support for SDPs in Western Europe develop over the period 2002-2014?

Subsequently, the main aim of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of voting for SDPs by integrating and testing the three main theories that have been introduced above. This leads to the following explanatory research question:

To what extent can class politics theory, the insider-outsider theory and the integration-demarcation cleavage theory explain whether people will vote or not for SDPs in Western Europe over the period 2002-2014?

In this thesis, a quantitative multilevel study of SDPs across Western Europe over a twelve year period (2002-2014) will be conducted. Most of the quantitative data will be derived from two major sources: the European Social Survey (ESS, n.d.) and the Manifesto Project (MP, n.d.) The European Social Survey is a large quantitative study which includes several relevant indicators for this thesis. It has an extensive range of indicators for political behaviour, and for this reason it will be used to analyse the political demand side in this thesis. On the contrary, the Manifesto Project is not a survey but a database that includes party positions on different issues which are derived from the analysis of political party manifestos before elections. It includes party positions of many European political parties on several issues of interest for which it will be used to analyse the supply side. In addition, the CHES Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and the Comparative Political Parties Dataset (CPPD) are utilised too. These two datasets will contribute to the operationalization of several variables.

Combining the data from the ESS and the MP allows it to investigate the effect of both supply side and demand side factors on voting for SDPs. This approach implicates that besides analysing micro-micro relations, the effects of macro-level variables on micro-level attitudes have to be estimated. Moreover, as the dependent variable is a categorical one (voting for SDPs or not voting for SDPs), a logistic regression instead of a regular OLS regression model has been chosen. Thus, a multi-level logistic regression analysis will be employed.

This thesis will start with a comprehensive review of the relevant literature in chapter 2. In this theoretical framework, the most important concepts will be explained, the relevant literature will be demonstrated and it will be shown where the theoretical gaps are exactly located. This includes a development of a number of hypotheses following from what has been discussed in the theoretical framework. Chapter 3 will consist of a method section and the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables. In chapter 4 the results of the research will be shown and the hypotheses will be tested. Lastly, in chapter 5, the results will be evaluated and the overall research question will be answered.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, the central theoretical concepts of this thesis will be explained. The chapter will start with elaborating on what social democracy actually is, how the first SDPs came about and how the electoral support for SDPs has developed over the last two decades. Next, a short overview of previous research about voting for SDPs will be provided. Thereafter I will introduce a rational choice perspective of voting. I will argue that the three main theories that will be used in this thesis in fact all depart from a rational choice perspective. Subsequently the three central theories, class voting, insider-outsider politics and the integration-demarcation cleavage will be dealt with in understanding those sets of preferences that are influential for voting or not voting for SDPs. The integration-demarcation theory perspective includes a discussion of the effect of populist parties on voting for SDPs.

2.1 Social Democracy

Before the main theoretical approaches will be discussed, it has to be made clear what social democracy exactly is in order to provide conceptual clarity. This section will discuss what I consider as social democracy and how SDPs can be characterized the best. Subsequently it will be shown how SDPs emerged by providing a brief historical overview. This last subsection will touch upon the electoral situation of SDPs in recent years, something which will be reviewed more extensively in the analysis.

2.1.1 Definition

It is important to acknowledge that there is not one single embraced definition of social democracy. According to Keating and McCrone (2013), it should not be seen as a rigid

concept that includes only one case, but as a 'family-resemblance' concept which allows for different cases to be included. Diamond (2012) holds a similar view. He stresses that social democracy is not a fixed approach, but a '*set of changing programmatic commitments informed by an enduring framework of ethical values*' (Diamond, 2012, 7). The most important ethical value is the ideal that all human misery and suffering should be abolished. Historically, social democracy is related to a commitment to redistribution, control of markets through government intervention and an emphasis on people's welfare (ibid., 2012). Other scholars largely demonstrate similar arguments. Especially the fact that social democracy seeks to correct market capitalism, by reducing inequalities in society, is often mentioned (Keating and McCrone, 2013).

Yet, this is still tremendously broad. Keating and McCrone (2013) therefore argue that there are two key ideas that are strongly connected to social democracy irrespective of which time period we are talking about. The first core characteristic is an acceptance of the influential value of the market, but with the view that it needs to be politically and socially constrained. The second key idea is the aim for social solidarity and equality. This means that social democrats believe in the use of public power to prevent excessive inequalities from emerging. Huo's (2009, 8-21) argument is quite similar, but instead of mentioning the market explicitly Huo sees solidarity and egalitarianism as the two key values that define social democracy. In short, solidarity here aims at harmonizing common interests across different social classes. Egalitarianism is best illustrated by redistribution, which aims at improving the economic position of the people that are the worst-off in society.

Nevertheless, one can still argue that the values mentioned here are not only exclusively the views of SDPs. Other parties that are close to them, such as Christian democratic parties, have adhered to the same values. Keating and McCrone (2013) do

not see this as a real problem, because in general the elements discussed above give a good definition of social democracy. Huo (2009, 20) on the other hand clearly defines the differences between social democracy and Christian democracy. He argues that the Christian democratics' conception of solidarity is different because it is based more on the belief that collective mobilisation through the state should be subordinate to mobilisation in communities such as the church and families. Concerning egalitarianism, Huo claims that this is more important for social democrats than for Christian democrats.

A critique on the key ideas and values discussed before is that although these reflected social democracy well for most of the 20th century, it might be that they do less so regarding modern SDPs. In the late 1990s, inspired by disappointing electoral results and the right-wing dominance over the executive in many countries, several SDPs in Western Europe (but also the US) committed themselves to 'Third Way politics' (BBC, 1999). Giddens (1998), one of the founders of the movement, suggests that most of the values which are mentioned above relate more to classical social democracy, what Giddens calls the 'the old left'. Instead, he proposes a 'Third Way' between old style social democracy and neoliberalism. The Third Way was marked by a departure from the traditional socialist idea that there should be an alternative to the market to the more neoliberal position that the market should be accepted, but with the condition that it has to be governed and regulated (Lovell, 2000). In essence, the Third Way was different from the old left in that capitalism was no longer perceived to be problematic (Crouch, 2013).

Another important feature of the Third Way was that it argued that unemployment, sickness and disability were mostly 'old' social risks. Instead, a few 'new' risks were added to the analysis, such as the entry of large numbers of women into the

labour force and the ageing of the population (Crouch, 2013). Compared with the key ideas posed by Huo (2009) and Keating and McCrone (2013), Giddens (1998) first of all does not include the focus on solidarity when characterizing the Third Way. In addition, the movement can also be perceived as a shift from equality of outcome to equality of opportunity (Crouch, 2013). Equality of outcome is the idea that all people should have approximately the same wealth, while equality of opportunity goes less far and only requires that everyone has the same chance for acquiring wealth. Thus, equality of outcome seeks to make sure that all people in society end with more or less the same wealth while equality of opportunity only provides an equal starting position for everyone (ibid., 2013). Second, the Third Way is different in that it has a slightly different position (more neoliberal) on the role of the market.

Furthermore, the Third Way has a cultural dimension too as the aim of the Third Way goes further than merely looking at the role of economics (Giddens, 1998, 64-68). This cultural agenda implies that SDPs have to contest the cultural protectionism that is supported by far right parties. The Third Way stands for cosmopolitan pluralism which values the increasing diversity in humanity and societal groups which is the consequence of a globalised world. It also supports cultural pluralism, which incorporates for example issues as immigration. The Third Way emphasises the positive effects of immigration and has cosmopolitan nationalism as its ideal. Cosmopolitan nationalism implies that people can feel that they are not just part of one national community, but that they can have multiple nationalities (ibid., 133-138). Additionally, the Third Way also highly values cosmopolitan democratic projects such as the EU, although it is recognised that the EU has legitimacy problems as well (ibid., 138-144).

Whether or not the Third Way has fundamentally changed the key values of social democracy is a very big question that goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless,

I argue that these three values, market governance, equality and solidarity, still represent social democracy well. Concerning the market social democracy may have adapted a more lenient position, but it is still recognised that there should be a government that regulates it. Equality is still one of the major concepts within the movement, and even though solidarity is not mentioned as a key concept by Giddens (1998), it has not been argued by this scholar that it does not apply anymore to current social democracy. Altogether, in this thesis, I define social democracy as a political movement which aims at increasing people's welfare by governing and correcting the free market that tends to disadvantage the lower strata in society, enhancing equality and promoting solidarity between different groups in society.

It must be noted, however, that I do not intend to test whether SDPs actually meet these criteria. The added value of such a test is very low since there is a certain degree of consensus between scholars about which parties belong to the social democratic party family and which ones do not. In practice, all SDPs are centre-left parties. Many of them can be recognised by their names: SDPs often call themselves a 'labour party', 'socialist party', 'democratic party' or just simply a 'social democratic party'. Once more, as social democracy is seen as a family-resemblance concept, different parties can be grouped under this heading.

2.1.2 The Origins of Social Democracy

The origins of social democracy go back to the mid-19th century. Inspired by the Communist Manifesto written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, in 1848 a revolution broke out in Germany. Bourgeois democrats started to fight for a parliamentary state with equal voting rights, supported by working class citizens who hoped to improve on their lives (Dahm et al., 2013). From this revolution the Workers' Brotherhood emerged,

whose members called themselves 'social democrats'. With this term, they intended to demonstrate that they did not only fight for the social causes of workers, such as changing the way economic relations shaped society, but also for the freedom to establish their own representative organisations. After all, before the 1848 revolution workers were not allowed to organise themselves in Germany (ibid., 2013).

In 1869, following from the German Workers' Brotherhood, the first SDP in Europe emerged: the *Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei* (SDAP) (ibid., 2013). Shortly after, in many other European countries similar parties came up to the surface. Most of the early SDPs were often strongly related to trade unions. These parties shared one core characteristic: to defend the interests of workers and ordinary people. The German SDAP became a real role model for SDPs around Europe because of its size and success (Berger, 2012).

The first half of the 20th century was marked by the two world wars. The social democrats in this period mainly fought against competition from communist and fascist parties. Instead of supporting a 'proletarian dictatorship' as proposed by hard line communists, social democracy became the main defender of liberal democracy (ibid., 2012). After the 1930s, the social democratic focus on Germany declined and shifted to the Scandinavian countries, as the Swedish social democrats managed to initiate a number of reforms that greatly enhanced the social equality in Sweden. The initial Swedish focus on fairness and equality still constitutes a large part of the social democratic ideology today (ibid., 2012).

2.1.3 Social Democratic Parties in recent years

In practically all Western European countries, SDPs have seen a decrease in their electoral support over the years. Typical for this development has been the situation in

the Nordic countries, where social democracy historically has been very strong. For example, in Norway and Sweden SDPs dominated politics for most of the 20th century. Nowadays, these parties have to fight very hard even to get into a government coalition (McCrone and Keating, 2013). Yet, the electoral loss of social democracy in the Nordic region is relatively low compared to other regions in Western Europe. In Great Britain for instance, the percentage of votes for the Labour Party over the period 1998-2008 has dropped with more than 15 percentage points. In Austria, the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland similar developments can be seen (ibid., 2013). In Southern Europe the picture is a bit different. In Greece, Portugal and Spain, SDPs fared fairly well after these countries became democracies. Yet, the economic crisis in the late 2000s changed this pattern. In all three countries the social democratic vote share lowered dramatically. Especially in Greece, the centre-left PASOK was hit hard when their electoral support sank from around 40 percent in 2006 to 12 percent in 2012 (ibid., 2013). As a result, it is safe to say that SDPs all over Western Europe are experiencing difficult times at the moment.

The downward trend in electoral support for SDPs makes it particularly interesting to look at the people that vote for these parties. Enhancing our knowledge about social democratic voters makes it possible to analyse the underlying developments that have made it more difficult for SDPs to find electoral support. In the remainder of this chapter I will demonstrate my theoretical approach for doing so.

2.2 Voting for Social Democratic Parties

In the previous section background information about social democracy and SDPs has been provided. In order to understand why people vote for SDPs, this section will focus on the theory that can explain why people make this decision. The section will start with

a short overview of the most relevant findings of previous research. Thereafter I will elaborate on rational choice theory. In this thesis, rational choice is used as the overarching theory for the three main theoretical approaches, as I argue that each of these theories can be essentially traced back to rational choice theory. Subsequently, the three main theories of the thesis will be discussed. For each theory it will be shown how it relates to rational choice theory and how it can explain why people vote for SDPs.

2.2.1 Previous Research

Most of the early research that links SDPs and voting behaviour focuses on class politics. Viewing society as composed of several social classes stems from Marxist theory (Knutsen, 2007). Marx identified three fundamental classes in capitalist societies: capitalists that own the means of production, workers that sell their labour and the bourgeoisie which owns means of production but does not hire workers (ibid., 2007). According to Marx, the dominant classes in society will try to maintain the control over the means of production in order to uphold the political power that comes with that control (Jansen, 2011). After WWII, the idea of a class division in society was elaborated further by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). These scholars argued that there was indeed a class cleavage which originated from the Industrial Revolution and was much more dominant than any other cleavage in society. On the one hand there are the owners and employers and on the other hand the workers and tenants (Knutsen, 2007). At the same time, scholars started to investigate the relationship between social class and voting behaviour. They found that the working class was indeed the most likely to vote for left-wing parties, while the other classes tended to support right-wing parties (ibid., 2007).

SDPs have thus traditionally been the political representatives of workers. With the expansion of suffrage to workers in the beginning of the 20th century, SDPs tried to

take advantage of the new political rights for the working class. In their efforts, many parties adopted Marxist ideas and were of the opinion that capitalism should be ideally replaced by a socialist order (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2011). Therefore, social democracy almost exclusively relied on electoral support from working class citizens. In the course of the 20th century SDPs in Western Europe however became much more moderate. They started to accept capitalism and settled for a more mixed economy with less state intervention. As a consequence, SDPs became catch-all parties that not only attracted working class voters, but middle-class voters as well (ibid., 2011).

Przeworksi and Sprague (1986) are amongst the most famous scholars who have done research to SDPs and class politics. They argue as well that, although the traditional constituency of SDPs is the working class, in the second half of the 20th century the middle class increasingly voted for SDPs. This has provided SDPs with a dilemma, since when defending the interests of one group, it is likely that the other group will not feel represented and therefore will not support SDPs.

Przeworksi and Sprague have been mostly criticised for not specifying the relevant policy issues that play a role for the electoral dilemma of SDPs. Moreover, according to Kitschelt (1993), class analysis alone is too weak to predict voting behaviour. Class theory assumes a distinction between owners and non-owners, but Kitschelt claims that in practice this image is just too simplistic. People's market positions are made up by many factors that are not well represented by class (Kitschelt, 1993, 301).

Kitschelt has not been the only scholar to criticise the relationship between social class and voting. Over the last thirty years, there has been a fierce debate between those who claim that social class is declining for predicting voting behaviour and those who argue against such a universal decline (Jansen, 2011). For example, Knutsen (2007)

suggests that class voting is clearly deteriorating, driven by growing prosperity, a decline in industrial workers and centrist strategies of both left and right political parties. On the other hand, Elff (2007) contends that scholars who argue in favour of a decline exaggerate. Only in a few countries class politics has become less relevant, which thus demonstrates that in general the relationship between social class and voting behaviour continues to exist. Both cases seem plausible, which leaves us with a stalemate.

Nevertheless, there are also scholars who provide a more nuanced argument. Jansen (2011) demonstrates that although class voting is indeed lessening, 'the death of class politics' is out of the question. In most countries, social class maintains its effects on party choice, only the magnitude of those effects is weakening. Moreover, the last generation of academics studying class and voting behaviour have shown that it would be incorrect to assume that the class cleavage always aligns with the left-right dimension. There is some evidence to believe that the class cleavage cuts across the left-right dimension (Knutsen, 2007). This would mean that for every party on the left-right dimension, electoral support will come from different social classes. In any case, as it can be expected that class voting is falling, in recent years scholars more and more have linked other factors with the likelihood that people vote for SDPs.

A scholar that claims that not social class, but a different factor is important for explaining who votes for SDPs is Rueda (2005). Although SDPs are seen by class theorists as the defenders of labour interests, Rueda (2005) argues that this assumption is wrong. He shows that since the early 1970s, a large amount of the workforce in Western Europe has been equipped with a rising job security. At the same time, a considerable amount of workers, partly instigated the 1973 oil crisis, became unemployed, and labour contracts became progressively flexible and part-time.

According to Rueda, this has led to the emergence of insiders and outsiders on the labour market. Insiders are those workers with protected jobs, while outsiders are workers with less job protection. Rueda argues that it is not either the working class or the middle class who votes for SDPs, but especially the insiders on the labour market. SDPs can attract both groups, depending on the strategy they will use. Nevertheless, Rueda (2005) claims that SDPs can pursue the largest electoral support by focusing on insiders while ignoring outsiders.

This dilemma seems similar to that of Przeworski and Sprague. Nevertheless, where these scholars stress the importance of social class, the insider-outsider theory argues that there is an effect independent of social class. Lindvall and Rueda (2014) find an autonomous effect of the insider-outsider distinction, even after controlling for social class. They argue that the insider-outsider division cross-cuts social class. For example, the working class is divided in both a group of insiders and a group of outsiders (ibid., 2014). This can be explained by the fact that low-paid work or manual labour is not always equivalent to having a low degree of job security. As they only examine the Swedish case, Lindvall and Rueda argue that more research on the differences between insiders and outsiders for other countries is needed.

In analysing Sweden, Lindvall and Rueda (2014) do however not provide a clear quantitative indicator for measuring the position of the Swedish social democrats on employment policies. Lindvall and Rueda (2012) used data from an earlier publication (Lindvall and Rueda, 2012), where they already analysed Swedish party positions. However, they determined these party positions mainly with the help of citizen surveys, not with expert surveys or party manifestos. Moreover, although Lindvall and Rueda (2012;2014) argue that the Swedish social democrats got more votes from outsiders and

fewer votes from insiders when they paid less attention to employment protection, this relationship is not directly tested in a quantitative model.

The argument of both Przeworksi and Sprague and Rueda relies on a dominance of economic issues in people's decision to vote or not vote for SDPs. This is not an uncontested assumption. On the one hand it is argued that cleavages are becoming less important, and that citizens increasingly vote in a more fluid, issue-based way (Grande, 2012). On the other hand there are scholars that firmly defend the relevance of the left-right dimension (ibid., 2012). Recently, a group of scholars has claimed that political cleavages do still matter, but that we cannot speak of a one-dimensional political structure in Western Europe anymore. Instead, Grande and Kriesi (2012) argue that fuelled by the process of globalization, a new political cleavage has emerged, the 'integration-demarcation' cleavage. On the integration-end of the cleavage, there are the people that are in favour of an increasing global integration of cultural, economic and political values. On the demarcation-end, there are those who firmly oppose the process of global integration and call for more national autonomy. Thus, Kriesi et al. (2012) argue that the traditional worker-owner cleavage has been replaced by the integration-demarcation cleavage, between the 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization. This cleavage presumes a two-dimensional structure: one dimension which is marked by economic conflict and a second dimension which is constituted by cultural conflict (Grande and Kriesi, 2012). According to Grande and Kriesi (2012), in recent years cultural issues have become much more important for party competition than economic issues.

A development which is closely related to the increasing relevance of cultural issues has been the rise of populist parties over the last fifteen to twenty years. Scholars who study populist parties reason that the growing importance of cultural issues has led to the rise of radical right populist parties (Grande and Kriesi, 2012). As a result, it has

been claimed by Bale et al. (2010) that populist parties have increasingly attracted working class voters that traditionally supported SDPs.

Populism has been a very popular topic for political scientists to investigate over the last years. The most influential definition of populism has been provided by Mudde (2004). He claims that populism is a thin ideology that considers society to be divided in two antagonistic and homogenous groups: the pure people and the corrupt elite. Populism wants politics to reflect the general will of the people (ibid., 2004). Therefore populist parties often speak on behalf of 'the people'. The fact that populism is a thin ideology means that it does not provide a comprehensive vision of society (Abts and Rummens, 2007). Thus, populist parties can be located across the political spectrum. Nevertheless, regarding Western European politics, academics have largely focussed on the rise of right-wing populist parties or radical right populist parties[1] and how this has influenced political parties and party systems. Especially about populist radical right parties (PRRPs) more work has been done than on all the other party families combined (Mudde, 2013).

Because of this overwhelming scholarly attention, one would expect that PRRPs play a huge role in Western European politics. Many scholars that devote attention to PRRPs argue that these parties have significantly changed party competition in Western Europe. However, Mudde (2013; 2014) shows that these claims cannot really be backed by empirical results. He shows that over the years 2000-2009, PRRPs on average have won only 5.9 per cent of the seats in Western Europe (2013, 4). Then, it is hard to expect that these parties will have a big influence on contemporary Western European politics. In addition, Mudde (2014) demonstrates that PRRPs have not fundamentally changed

[1] To support this claim: when entering the words "left wing populism" in Google Scholar, I got exactly 727 hits. After entering the words "right wing populism", I got more than 6000 hits (April 2016).

party systems in Western Europe. Only in half of the Western European countries PRRPs have been electorally successful, but even in those countries for mainstream parties it has been quite simple to keep PRRPs out of government (ibid., 2014).

Nonetheless, Mudde does not counter the claim that PRRPs can pose serious challenges to other political parties. Therefore it is crucial to gain knowledge about the extent to which the electoral support for SDPs can be influenced by the presence of PRRPs. According to Bale et al. (2010, 412), PRRPs are capable of depriving SDPs from winning either votes and/or office. It is argued that blue-collar workers, people with part-time jobs and the unemployed -in other words, the groups in society that are likely to vote for SDPs- can be increasingly attracted by successful PRRPs.

Unfortunately, although it is known that PRRPs can appeal to voters that traditionally belong to the social democratic electorate, there are not many scholars that have explained this relationship from a social democratic point of view and have analysed to what extent PRRPs form a direct electoral threat for SDPs. Meret and Siim (2013) are one of the few that have published on this topic. Starting from a focus on Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, these authors show that Nordic right-wing populism combines forms of economic protectionism and cultural nativism poses a real challenge for SDPs in the Nordic region. Nordic SDPs have failed to address migration issues and how to defend worker-issues on a transnational level, while the populist parties totally commit themselves to these issues (ibid., 2013). Although their argument is quite convincing, no empirical evidence is presented.

In sum, early research on voting for SDPs has focused much on social class. More recently scholars have however shown that social class is becoming less relevant for determining who will vote for SDPs. Therefore several alternative theories have been developed. The insider-outsider theory has moved away from social class and instead

concentrates on people's position on the labour market, while the integration-demarcation cleavage theory argues that party competition increasingly pivots upon cultural issues.

Yet, I have not clarified why I have chosen to focus especially on the theories which have been mentioned. In the following subsections I will justify this choice by discussing how they relate to each other and which different theoretical expectations result from the theories of interest.

2.2.2 Rational choice theory and voting

Although none of the authors that have been discussed before have mentioned it explicitly, I argue that their theories all depart from a rational choice point of view. In this subsection I will demonstrate what rational choice theory exactly is and what it means for the different theories.

One of the most influential early works on rational choice theory comes from Downs (1957) who uses a rational choice perspective to explain voting behaviour. Rational choice is essentially nothing more than the claim that in an ideal situation, someone will always prefer the option that generates the highest amount of 'utility'. This is done by subtracting the expected costs from the benefits for each of the available options. From a rational choice perspective, a person will vote for that party that will provide her/him with maximal gains given their individual preferences.

However, Downs (1957) claimed that a true rational citizen would never vote, because it is simply too costly. Voting does bring certain benefits, but according to Downs these will be largely outweighed by the fact that it is impossible for one individual vote to determine the outcome. As a result, the free rider problem arises. Because it is very unlikely for a single person to have a decisive vote and voting asks

citizens to do effort, people will be more probable to abstain from voting. Yet, if too many people would act accordingly, this would be highly problematic for the whole system of representative democracy (ibid., 1957).

Although Downs' reasoning is consistent theoretically, it does not represent the empirical situation. Turnout rates have indeed been declining over the last fifty years (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2011), but in all Western European countries[2] a majority of the electorate has voted during the latest parliamentary elections (ibid., 2011). Therefore, over the years several scholars (Blais and Young, 1999; Green and Shapiro, 1994) have demonstrated that Downs' pure version of rational choice theory does not hold. One of the flaws of pure rational choice theory is that it assumes that people have perfect information, which is hardly ever the case. Nevertheless, rational choice theory does not need to be refuted. Over the years more mitigated concepts of the theory have become ubiquitous. It has been shown that in many situations citizens indeed seem to make a cost-benefit calculation, although we know little about when this is exactly the case (Blais and Young, 1999).

According to Simon (1997, 295-298), this is best explained by the fact that the assumption of optimization is problematic. Optimization is another way of saying that a rational person will always attempt to obtain the highest possible utility. However, in real world situations optimization is hardly possible, because there are millions of factors that can play a role in a particular process. Even the most powerful computers in the world would not be able to calculate most decisions, let alone people. Therefore,

[2] Except for Switzerland, where on average only 46.7 percent of the electorate has voted over the period from 2000-2009 (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2011). There are two main explanations for this: In Switzerland, people already go to the ballot boxes almost once every three months in direct democratic referenda. Thus people might perceive the general elections as less important as they feel that the real decisions are made in the referenda (Blais, 2014). Second, in Switzerland the main parties share power in the executive. Accordingly, citizens' votes have not a very sound effect on which parties will be in government, and citizens might perceive it as useless to vote anyway (ibid., 2014).

Simon argues that people do not optimize, but satisfice. The difference between satisficing and optimizing is that while optimizing is about choosing the best available option, satisficing is about choosing the option which meets a set of criteria, but that is not guaranteed to be the best (Simon, 1997, 295).

All in all, rational choice theory assumes that people have preferences and will choose the option that satisfices these preferences the best as possible. Therefore people will vote for the party which is the most likely to satisfice their preferences. These preferences are often measured in terms of economic rewards. However, and this is key for the theoretical approach of this thesis, other types of preferences can just as well play a role in people's decision to vote. In short, although class voting theory still assumes that people's preferences are purely based on the extent to which one's job is economically valued, the insider-outsider theory moves away from this by arguing that it is the level of employment security that one enjoys that is crucial for one's voting behaviour. The integration-demarcation cleavage theory even goes a step further by claiming that economic preferences are losing its influence on party competition and that it is people's cultural preferences which decide on what party people will vote. Thus, the relevant theories for this thesis all have in common that they essentially assume that people vote for those parties that will provide them with the best amount of utility under the circumstances. At the same time, the theories fundamentally differ from each other on the relevant preferences that play a role regarding voting behaviour.

In the subsections below I will demonstrate what the relevant preferences are for each of the three main theories. Additionally I will discuss the theoretical expectations that can be derived from the theory.

2.2.3 Class Voting

Class voting theory expects that especially those citizens at the bottom of society, the working class, will vote for SDPs, while the middle class will vote for right-wing parties. This tendency can be largely explained by the fact that the working class benefits the most from government protection and redistribution policies. These policies are strongly related to left-wing parties such as SDPs. The middle class, because of their privileged economic position, is however more likely to benefit from a small government and lower taxes, a position that is represented by right-wing parties. Accordingly rational working class citizens will vote for left-wing parties and rational middle class citizens will vote for right-wing parties, because this is economically the most profitable for them.

Class voting is thus a clear example of rational choice theory: it expects that people want to maximize their financial position depending on their own class status. People from the lower social classes have an interest in a comprehensive system of social security, whereas people from the higher social classes prefer this system to be as minimal as possible in order to keep the taxes at a lower level. As a result of this I expect that it will be the working class which will form the largest group of electoral support for SDPs. This leads to the following hypothesis H1:

H1: Citizens belonging to the working class are more likely to vote for SDPs than citizens that belong to the middle class.

Przeworski and Sprague (1986) demonstrate that SDPs, although coming sometimes very close to it, never managed to get numerical majorities in the electoral process across Europe. This can be explained by the fact that workers, the traditional

constituency of socialist parties, never constituted a majority in any European country. Therefore, socialist parties decided to broaden their reach to appeal other voters such as society's middle class, which entailed that they had to abandon their emphasis on the working class. However, because of the decision to compete for a broader group in society, workers started to approach socialist parties just like any other party in the electoral system: by comparing the policies they could offer to them (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986).

The fact that SDPs increasingly started to appeal to the middle class became very problematic when in the late 1970s the social democratic electoral support began to wane. The fact that, instead of only the working class they now had to please two different groups in society provided SDPs with a serious dilemma (ibid., 1986). When socialist parties pursue to win votes in the process of electoral competition they have to partly give up their class-based ideology. By doing this, SDPs make it almost impossible to organize workers as a class, and thus it is very probable that they will lose a part of their working class support. Nevertheless, when they decide not to abandon their class-based ideology it is in turn very improbable that they can broaden their constituency. In either way, SDPs seem unable to win (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986, 55-56).

As recognized before, a major flaw of Przeworski and Sprague's theory is that it does not specify *how* SDPs can appeal to either the working or the middle class. Although it is stated that both groups have different interests that often conflict, those interests are not clearly defined. Przeworski and Sprague (1986, 82-83) do provide some examples. For instance, they demonstrate that increasing the minimum wage can be beneficial for the working class but detrimental for the middle class. Nevertheless, such an example is too specific in order to assess whether SDPs have appealed to the

middle class or not. Thus, it is not clearly indicated what the class-based ideology then might be and which policy positions are related to this.

The flaw has been recognised by Kitschelt (1993, 321), who states that Przeworski and Sprague fail to specify what political appeals produce the electoral dilemma for SDPs. In a later publication, Kitschelt (1999) specifies the factors that are relevant for this dilemma: "*Either SDPs stay or are pushed into the opposition because they signal aversion to economic liberalization policies. Or social democrats embrace such policies, but then experience precipitous electoral decline*" (Kitschelt, 1999, 324). Economic liberalization includes the promotion of deregulation, free trade, the elimination of subsidies and price controls, and the privatisation and downsizing of public services (Woodward, 1992). Kitschelt explains the dilemma by arguing that embracing economic liberalization policies will alienate the core voters of SDPs, who expect a defence of the welfare state and short-term job creation (ibid., 1999, 324). The working class has a high interest in the provision of social security after all. For middle class citizens, economic liberalization policies can be expected to be more beneficial, since these policies tend to make the government smaller. These kinds of policies usually aim at the downsizing of public services and a greater role for private suppliers. This can induce a lower tax rate (Boix, 1998). Furthermore, the middle class is less likely to profit from a system of social security anyway, as they are less often eligible to receive financial help from the government.

As the core voters of SDPs are traditionally the working class citizens, it can be expected that they will not support SDPs when these parties propose economic liberalization policies because financially those policies will be in their disadvantage. Indeed, the working class is much more likely to profit from an extensive welfare state. Citizens that belong to the working class usually have occupations that provide them

with lower wages than middle class citizens, which means that for the working class social security is often crucial for them for providing their basic needs.

According to the social democratic 'dilemma', it can thus be expected that working class citizens will vote for political parties that will provide them with the most extensive welfare programmes, while the middle class will vote for parties that give more space to the free market. Regarding SDPs, the extent to which a class effect can be found thus depends on the party position of SDPs on economic liberalization policies. Therefore this dilemma is based on rational choice theory as well: the positions of SDPs regarding these economic liberalization policies influences whether people perceive voting for SDPs to be beneficial or not given their own situation. All in all, it is expected that the class effect, which predicts that working class citizens are more likely to vote for SDPs than middle-class citizens, will diminish when SDPs adopt economic liberalization policies, but will increase when SDPs reject those policies. This leads to the following hypothesis H2:

H2: The more SDPs favour economic liberalization policies, the smaller the effect of class voting on voting for SDPs.

2.2.4 Insider-Outsider theory

A theory that is similar to the class politics theory is the insider-outsider theory from Rueda (Rueda, 2005; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014). This theory assumes a rational choice perspective which is based on people's economic preferences as well. In contrast with class voting theory, this approach however argues that it is not so much social class which poses a dilemma for SDPs, but the political behaviour of insiders and outsiders in the labour market.

According to Rueda (2005), insiders are wage-earners with protected jobs that are not very troubled about high rates of unemployment. This is not to say that insiders cannot lose their jobs, but that they do have less reason to believe that this will happen. As a consequence, insiders are those workers who are the most likely to benefit from employment protection policies[3]. This will make it possible for insiders to retain their protection position on the labour market after all. On the other hand, outsiders are workers who enjoy low levels of job protection or are unemployed. They are those workers with low salaries and little social security privileges. For outsiders, employment protection policies are disadvantageous since these will make it harder for outsiders to be hired. Lower levels of employment protection help outsiders insofar as it will facilitate a departure from unemployment or jobs with only moderate labour conditions (ibid., 2005).

SDPs are the traditional defenders of labour interests and subsequently it has been assumed that workers constitute the largest group of electoral support for SDPs. However, since the 1970s under social democratic governments, a strong increase in unemployment has been noticed anyway. According to Rueda (2005), this contradiction can be explained by the fact that SDPs have transformed their policy goals in order to primarily attract electoral support insiders instead of outsiders. As a result of that, Rueda argues that SDPs currently defend the interests of insiders while ignoring those of the outsiders. He demonstrates that such a strategy, which is based on maintaining the employment protection for insiders, can win SDPs more votes than a strategy that focuses on outsiders (ibid., 2005).

[3] Employment protection policies are only one part of Rueda's (2005) argument. He also demonstrates what the impact is of labour market policies, which in contrast tend to benefit outsiders. However, because I could not measure party positions on labour market policies with the available data, I decided not to include the role of labour market policies but to focus on employment protection policies only.

Because SDPs have primarily aimed for attaining the electoral support of insiders, it can be expected that insiders have a higher change of voting for SDPs than outsiders. It was noticed in the previous paragraph that insiders benefit from employment protection policies while these are in the disadvantage of outsiders. The insider-outsider theory is therefore another example of rational choice theory, but differs from class politics theory on the preferences that influence people's decisions. According to the insider-outsider theory, the relevant preferences arise from people's positions on the labour market and are preferences about employment protection. Since it was recognised that SDPs in recent years have dedicated themselves to retain a significant level of employment protection, it can be expected that insiders have bigger chances to vote for SDPs than outsiders. This leads to the following hypothesis H3:

H3: Insiders are more likely than outsiders to vote for SDPs.

From an economic voting perspective, outsiders are thus less likely to support political parties that devote substantial resources to employment protection. These types of policies are likely to make it more difficult for outsiders to work or to switch jobs without providing this group with additional benefits. On the contrary, insiders are more likely to vote for political parties that favour employment protection policies.

Thus, since insiders have become increasingly attracted by SDPs this has resulted in an almost diabolic dilemma: if SDPs propagate employment policies that will benefit outsiders, they risk losing the support of insiders. But if SDPs intend to devote more resources to employment protection in order to retain the support of insiders, they risk losing the electoral support of outsiders. This is another example of rational choice theory. One the one hand, insiders have an interest in retaining a substantive level of

employment protection and will vote for SDPs whenever these parties pronounce to do this, but turn away from SDPs when they want to make employment more flexible. On the other hand, outsiders will vote for SDPs when they move away from retaining high levels of employment protection, but turn their backs on SDPs whenever these parties fail to do that. Altogether, it can be expected that the effect of the insider/outsider division on the likelihood that people vote for SDPs will be enhanced when SDPs take in a more positive position towards employment protection. This leads to the following hypothesis H4:

H4: The more SDPs favour employment protection policies, the larger the effect of the insider/outsider division on voting for SDPs.

2.2.5 Integration-demarcation cleavage theory

In the previous subsections I have demonstrated that both the class politics theory and the insider-outsider theory essentially come down to rational choice theory. I will argue here that the integration-demarcation theory is an example of rational theory choice as well. As mentioned before, however, the integration-demarcation theory contends that cultural issues are crucial for predicting voting behaviour too. This contrasts with the class politics and insider-outsider theories which only focus on economic preferences and do not consider cultural issues to be relevant.

Through globalization, the economy has become more competitive and open. This has been to the detriment of the low-educated workers. In relative terms, it can be expected that lower-educated citizens have to deal more often with the negative consequences of globalization, such as the translocation of labour-intensive processes to low-wage countries (Grande and Kriesi, 2012). In addition, they are more likely to be

negatively affected by migration as this will only increase the supply of low-skilled labour. Thus, low-educated workers are often seen as the 'losers' of globalization. In opposition to this, high-educated workers are often considered to be the globalization 'winners' (ibid., 2012). This group has a far higher potential to benefit from an open and competitive economy since their education enables them to work in more diverse places. Globalization will provide this group with more opportunities for having a suitable job, and migration will not affect the higher-educated as much as the lower-educated (ibid., 2012).

Furthermore, cultural issues have become more salient through globalization as well. Globalization has resulted in a significant higher cultural diversity within Western European societies. Studies have shown that the real effects of globalization on the economy, in contrast to what has been discussed in the previous paragraph, are actually quite small. For example, the job loss of low-educated workers instigated by the entering of low-skilled immigrants on the labour market is negligible. Instead, it is mostly people's cultural values that are strongly linked to anti-immigration sentiments (Grande and Kriesi, 2012). Again, it is the higher-educated that seem to have fewer problems with immigration than the lower-educated. Therefore, Grande and Kriesi (2012) argue that the worker-owner cleavage with its one-dimensional socioeconomic left-right division has been replaced by the integration-demarcation cleavage which is two-dimensional and consists of an economic and cultural dimension. An important aspect of their argument is the convergence-hypothesis: the assumption that political parties recently have converged on the economic dimension, but are differentiated more and more on the cultural dimension since the 1990s (Kriesi, 2012). Consequently, cultural issues have increased in salience. However, welfare state issues continue to be the most salient issues for political parties (ibid., 2012). Thus, as a result of the increasing

importance of cultural issues, the integration-demarcation cleavage theory essentially argues that economic preferences are not the only preferences that matter. Cultural preferences play an influential role just as well.

Dolezal and Hutter (2012) investigate the impact of people's issue positions on the probabilities that they vote for a certain party family. Regarding SDPs, they show that relating to the economic dimension, welfare issues are very important for the SDP voting probabilities. For each increase in the degree in which people support welfare policies, the chance that that person votes for an SDP goes up too. In addition, the cultural dimension is also important. Cultural issues such as anti-immigration sentiments, attitudes towards cultural liberalism[4] and European integration[5] have a profound effect on the voting probabilities too. People who do not perceive immigration to be a big problem have a higher chance to vote for SDPs than those who are opposing it. And those who support cultural liberalist policies and European integration are more likely to vote for SDPs too (Dolezal and Hutter, 2012).

What these findings again show is that cultural issues play a significant role in determining people's voting preferences, and that the integration-demarcation cleavage is indeed an example of rational choice theory too, be it in a different form. Since the introduction of Third Way politics and probably even before, SDPs have defended cosmopolitan and cultural pluralism as well as transnational political integration. As a result, the fact that citizens who are open to these ideas are more likely to vote for SDPs

[4] Cultural liberalism reflects a person's position on how free people should be to adhere to cultural norms or not. Dolezal and Hutter (2012) measure this by analysing people's positions on the rights of gay men and lesbian women.

[5] European integration also has an economic aspect. Yet, as it has been recognized in the previous paragraph that political parties in Western Europe have largely converged over economic issues, it can be expected that the cultural aspects of European integration on voting behavior will be much more profound than the economic aspects.

can easily be explained. Therefore, it can be expected that people who take in a more positive position on cultural issues such as immigration, cultural liberalism and European integration, have a higher chance of voting for SDPs. This leads to the following hypothesis H5:

H5: The more positive attitude people have towards a) immigration, b) cultural liberalism and c) European integration, the more likely it is that they will vote for SDPs.

Yet, from a supply side perspective, the impact of social democratic party positions towards cultural issues on the likelihood that people will vote for these parties is largely untreated. In line with the citizens' positions on cultural issues, it can be expected that when a social democratic party adopts a pro-European, pro-cultural liberalism and pro-immigration position, they will gain the electoral support of citizens who have a positive attitude towards cultural issues. When SDPs take in a more negative party position it is likely that they will attract a broader electorate, but at the expense of the former group's support.

According to Grande and Kriesi (2012), combining cultural issues with economic issues in one political dimension is very difficult. This is exactly the reason why they argue for a two-dimensional structure. Since it is mostly the higher-educated that are considered to be the globalization 'winners', we can conclude that concerning cultural issues it is mostly the globalization 'winners' who vote for SDPs. However, it is also puzzling that potential voters for SDPs have very positive attitudes on welfare issues (Dolezal and Hutter, 2012). Welfare policies can be considered to mostly relate to people who have higher financial risks, which concerns rather the lower-educated, the

globalization 'losers'. For this reason, the question to what extent party positions on cultural issues influence who votes for SDPs when the party positions on economic issues are included in the analysis too arises. Since it has been demonstrated in the previous chapter that cultural issues have become more and more important over the past years, I will expect that the effect of party positions on cultural issues is robust when controlling for party positions on economic issues.

All in all, it can be expected that the effect of people's attitudes on cultural issues on the chances that they will vote for SDPs depends on the party positions of SDPs on these issues. For those people who value open policies towards immigration, cultural liberalism and European integration it can be expected that the more positive SDPs are towards these issues, the more likely that they will vote for SDPs. This leads to the following hypothesis H6:

H6: The more positive the party position of SDPs on a) immigration, b) cultural liberalism and c) European integration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on these issues on the voting probabilities for SDPs.

Recently, researchers have pointed to a different kind of factor that could be influential as well in order to determine who votes for SDPs: the rise of populist parties in Western European party systems. This factor is closely related to the integration-demarcation theory, since the increasing salience of cultural issues is strongly related with the rise of PRRPs in Western Europe. However, theory about the electoral competition between PRRPs and SDPs is partly related class politics theory as well, as it expects that it is mostly the working class voters that can be attracted by PRRPs.

According to Kriesi et al. (2012), those who support the accommodation of immigrants, positive cultural liberalist policies and European integration are more likely to vote for SDPs. However, it has also been argued that the working class is disproportionately affected by the process of globalization. Blue-collar workers are vulnerable for labour market risks and have less socioeconomic resources than white-collar workers. Moreover, working class people are often more negative about the cultural effects of globalization such as immigration and European integration (ibid., 2012). Therefore, following the integration-demarcation thesis, it can actually be expected that working class citizens have become less likely to vote for SDPs. The supply of PRRPs to the party system at the same time has provided these discontented working class citizens with a new option in party competition.

An important implication of this development therefore is that if those voters who would otherwise have voted for SDPs are increasingly attracted by PRRPs for any reason whatsoever, SDPs will simply lose voters. Yet, this effect can only be expected in countries where PRRPs have successfully managed to enter the party system and maintained this position, in other words, in countries where PRRPs have established a relatively 'strong' position. This expectation is based on rational choice theory, since when PRRPs can offer people cultural policies that are more in their interests, it is very likely that people will vote for PRRPs. Thus, in countries where PRRPs have become strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs. This leads to the following hypothesis H7:

H7: In countries where PRRPs are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs.

The assumption that PRRPs increasingly attract working class voters is largely based on the work of Kitschelt (1995). Kitschelt argued that in the 1970s and 1980s, political competition was essentially one-dimensional. So, socialist parties usually combined a socialist party position with a libertarian position, while capitalist parties propagated a more authoritarian position. In the 1990s, however, this one-dimensional political space changed into a two-dimensional spectrum where the socialist-capitalist dimension grew independent of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension. PRRPs now moved more to the centre of the socialist-capitalist dimension, but at the same time they remained very authoritative. This combination has allowed them to attract working class voters that are looking for more authoritarian alternatives for SDPs (Kitschelt, 2004).

Oesch (2008) also states that the working class is actually more likely than any other social class to vote for PRRPs. This goes directly against to what we would expect from the class politics theory, which expects the working class to vote for leftist parties that opt for more state intervention. Nevertheless, both Kriesi et al. (2012) and Oesch (2008) provide evidence to believe that the effect of economic issues has become much smaller than before, and that workers are increasingly motivated by the fact that they are afraid of the negative influence of globalization on a country's culture. Therefore, the entrance of PRRPs into Western European party systems has provided the working class with a new alternative.

Thus in recent years, PRRPs have become more and more able to attract those voters that would support SDPs otherwise, in other words, the working class. As rational choice theory would expect, this is caused by the fact that PRRPs can offer them those cultural policies which SDPs refuse to do, such as more cultural protectionism. Nevertheless, this development only took place in those countries where PRRPs successfully entered the party system. As a result, it can be expected that in countries

where PRRPs are strong, working class voters will be more likely to vote for PRRPs instead of SDPs, which lowers the likelihood that they will vote for SDPs. However, in countries where PRRPs are weak or not present at all in the party system, it can be expected that class effect from hypothesis H1 (*Citizens belonging to the working class are more likely to vote for SDPs than citizens that belong to the middle class*) remains unaffected. This leads to the following hypothesis H8:

H8: In countries where PRRPs are strong, the class effect will be smaller.

The literature focuses almost exclusively on PRRPs. From the late 1960s until the early 1980s, populism in Europe was nevertheless mainly advocated by left-wing parties (March, 2007). This changed in the 1980s when left-wing populists lost their radical style of practicing politics, consequently leaving space for right-wing populists to stand up. However, this did not mean the end of left-wing populism. In recent years a definite increase in left-wing populism has been noticed again.

Right-wing populists embrace identity issues (Rizzo, 2015). For example, issues that fall in this category are multiculturalism and immigration. Moreover, right-wing populism is divisive. Left-wing populists on the other hand stress the economic inequity and strive for equality and equal opportunities (March, 2007; Rizzo, 2015). And in contrast to right-wing populism, left-wing populism is mostly inclusive (ibid., 2015). Moreover, according to March (2007), left-wing populist parties attempt to profit from the alleged 'betrayal' of SDPs that have taken in more neoliberal positions. These populist parties present themselves as the real democratic socialists.

The rise of left-wing populism has been instigated by both the European enlargement, which has led to a growth in insecurity about jobs and welfare, and the

continuing inequalities on a global scale (ibid., 2007). Recently the economic and financial crisis that emerged in 2008 is likely to have contributed to the rise of left-wing populist parties. These 'new' left populists are different from the 'old' left-wing populists in that they have departed from the traditional Marxism's stress of class consciousness. They have especially presented themselves as an anti-globalization and anti-Europeanisation alternative (ibid., 2007).

It is noted that the 'new' left-wing populists mainly take in anti-globalization and anti-European integration positions. Nevertheless, this is combined with a strong leftist position on the left-right dimension. Therefore left-wing populists are ideologically very close to SDPs. From a rational choice perspective, when citizens get unhappy with SDPs' positions on the left-right dimension or on cultural issues, but only want to vote for left-wing parties, left-wing populist parties are the best alternative. As a result, I expect that people will feel attracted by left-wing populist parties in countries where these parties are strongly represented in the party system, which will make it less probable that citizens will vote for SDPs. This leads to the following hypothesis H9:

H9: In countries where left-wing populist parties are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs.

2.2.6 Summary of the Hypotheses

Table 2.1: Hypotheses Overview

Theory	*Level*	*Expectation / Hypothesis*
Class Politics	Micro	H1: Citizens belonging to the working class are more likely to vote for SDPs than citizens that belong to the middle class.
	Cross-level interaction	H2: The more SDPs favour economic liberalization policies, the smaller the effect of class voting on voting for SDPs.
Insider-outsider Politics	Micro	H3: Insiders are more likely than outsiders to vote for SDPs.
	Cross-level interaction	H4: The more SDPs favour employment protection policies, the larger the effect of the insider/outsider division on voting for SDPs.
Integration-demarcation Cleavage	Micro	H5: The more positive attitude people have towards a) immigration, b) cultural liberalism and c) European integration, the more likely it is that they will vote for SDPs.
	Cross-level interaction	H6: The more positive the party position of SDPs on a) immigration, b) cultural liberalism and c) European integration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on these issues on the voting probabilities for SDPs.
	Cross-level effect	H7: In countries where PRRPs are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs.
	Cross-level interaction	H8: In countries where PRRPs are strong, the class effect will be smaller.
	Cross-level effect	H9: In countries where left-wing populist parties are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs.

Chapter 3: Methodology

In this chapter the data, research methods and operationalization of this thesis will be discussed. First, I will briefly explain and justify the research approach which will be applied. Subsequently, I will justify my case selection choice. This includes a discussion of the country cases, the exact time period of interest and which parties I will mark as SDPs. Thereafter I will deal with the two major datasets from which the data will be derived: the European Social Survey and the Manifesto Project. The main features of these data sources will be reviewed and my choice for using them justified. I will briefly introduce the Comparative Political Parties Dataset and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey as well, which will be used to a lesser extent. Then, I will demonstrate how the variables are going to be operationalised in order to test the hypotheses that were formulated in the previous chapter. The last section of this chapter will discuss the research methods that will be used and a consideration of the advantages and drawbacks of these methods.

3.1 Research Approach

The aim of this thesis is to expand our knowledge about voting behaviour regarding SDPs across eighteen European countries and over a timespan of twelve years. Scholars who examine voting behaviour usually use quantitative approaches, because this makes it easier to analyse large numbers of voters at the same time and to generalize from the results. This is also the main reason for me to employ a quantitative approach. Doing a large-N quantitative research enables me to analyse what the probabilities are that people will vote for SDPs. Furthermore, such an approach also makes it possible to investigate both the influence of people's personal characteristics and the ideological

positions of SDPs on the probabilities that people vote for these parties. Therefore, a quantitative approach will deliver the best results considering the aim of this thesis.

3.2 Case selection

3.2.1 Country cases and time

I have chosen to focus on Western European countries only. The main reason for this choice is the fact that Eastern European politics is fundamentally different from Western European politics. In Eastern Europe we find post-communist party systems that are relatively new yet. As a result, the classification of parties into party families is much more obscure in this region, since the situation in Eastern Europe is not stable enough to speak of coherent party families (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2011). This is problematic for this thesis, as in order to analyse who votes for SDPs, it is essential to be sure about which parties can be actually characterised as SDPs. Therefore, this thesis will focus on the following eighteen Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The exact time period that will be investigated starts in 2002 and ends in 2014. The principal reason for looking at this period is the fact that in the literature about SDPs, much attention has been paid to the situation before the 2000s. In contrast, I am interested in more recent developments. In addition, there is also a practical reason. The main data set that will be used in this thesis, the European Social Survey, was published for the first time in 2002 and the most recent survey round was conducted in 2014.

3.2.2 Social Democratic Parties

For determining whether a party is a SDP or not, I will use the party family classification as provided in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). In most countries, there is only one SDP, but in two of the eighteen countries more than one SDP was noticed. First, in Belgium there is the Flemish 'SP.A', but also the Francophone 'PS'. Because both are significant parties, they are both included. Second, in Italy several parties merged into other ones during the 2000s. Therefore, for the first rounds the 'Democratici di Sinistra' is marked as a SDP, and in the last rounds this is the 'Partido Democratico'.

The CHES does not include four countries that are of interest in this thesis: Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland. For these countries, the SDPs have been indicated by the party family classification of the Manifesto Project. A table with all the SDPs per country can be found under heading A.1 in the appendix.

3.3 Data

In this section, I will demonstrate where the data comes from and why this data has been chosen. The four data sources that will be dealt with are the European Social Survey (ESS), the Manifesto Project (MP), the Comparative Political Parties Dataset (CPPD) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES).

3.3.1 European Social Survey

The ESS is a cross-national survey that has been conducted once every two years since 2002. It is a broad survey which contains many variables on all kinds of attitudes, beliefs and behavioural patterns (ESS, n.d.), including indicators for political attitudes, voting behaviour and individual characteristics. The number of relevant variables and indicators is therefore the main reason for using the ESS. Moreover, the variables cover

seven survey rounds from 2002 until 2014 in the eighteen Western European countries that are relevant for this thesis. This gives the possibility of investigating the effects across countries and over time. Nonetheless, the ESS has several drawbacks as well. The most relevant one for this thesis is the fact that the ESS only provides few variables that can indicate personal attitudes on economic issues, in contrast with cultural issues such as immigration for which several indicators have been included.

Furthermore, for five of the eighteen countries that have been included in the seven ESS rounds (2002-2014), one or more rounds are missing[6]. Nevertheless, since the ESS has nested data structure, I have decided to use the available data for these countries anyway. The more countries and rounds I can add to the dataset, the higher the statistical power of the models that will be analysed later in this thesis. On average, the ESS includes around 30.000 effective respondents per round for the eighteen relevant countries. The total effective N for the eighteen countries and the seven rounds is approximately 206.000.

The ESS dataset is not totally bias-free. As a consequence of the complex survey design, in some countries certain groups in society have a higher chance of being included in the sample than other groups (ESS, 2014). Furthermore, because the ESS samples only a small part of the actual population, it could be possible that the ESS suffers from sampling error (ibid., 2014). The survey has to deal with non-response as well, since not all the respondents in the random sample cooperate with the survey. The average response rate for all countries in the ESS for the seven available rounds is 60.3 percent (ESS, 2016).

[6] For Austria, there is no data of three rounds (2008, 2010, 2012), Greece misses three rounds (2006, 2012, 2014), Iceland misses five rounds (2002, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2014), Italy misses four rounds (2006, 2008, 2010, 2014) and Luxembourg also misses five rounds (2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014).

In order to limit these biases from muddling the results, the ESS provides several weighting variables. I will use two of them. The first one is a variable for weighting the design. This makes it possible to correct for the fact that some groups are over-represented or under-represented in the sample. Second, a post-stratification weight will be used to correct for sampling errors and non-response. This weight adjusts the sample by using information that is already known about a certain area such as people's age, gender and education levels.

3.2.3 Manifesto Project

The MP (also known as the Manifesto Research Group or the Comparative Manifestos Project) analyses party manifestos to determine the ideological and policy positions of political parties. Doing so, the MP has created a very large database of party positions in more than 50 countries (MP, n.d.). This database goes back to 1945 and is updated two times a year (ibid., n.d.). Thus, an advantage of the MP in comparison with for example an expert survey or a popular survey is that it does not rely on a possibly partial opinion, but on material which has been written by the parties itself. The MP includes several indicators for measuring party positions on cultural, economic and political issues that are relevant for this thesis. Moreover, party manifestos show exactly the ideological direction of the parties as they want to sell it to potential voters. Since I am also interested in the possible effects of party positions on voting behaviour, using manifesto data is the most direct manner of analysing this relationship.

One of the drawbacks of analysing party manifestos is that in countries where certain ideological differences between parties are very profound, party manifestos are not always a reliable source. In this situation parties have more freedom to present a different image of their actual position (Dinas and Gemenis, 2010). Concerning the MP in

specific, a disadvantage of this source is that for several countries the most recent elections (2012-2014) have not been coded yet. Furthermore, the way in which political parties were assigned to the social democratic party family is not in accordance to the definition of SDPs as used in this thesis. For example, the Dutch party D66 is seen as a SDP. However, D66 cannot really be considered to be a SDP, since D66 does not primarily aims at increasing people's welfare by governing and correcting the free market. Enhancing equality and promoting solidarity between different groups in society is not one of their main targets either. Instead, D66 is a liberal party that mostly stresses freedom and people's own responsibility. Therefore, as shortly mentioned in the case selection section, for determining which parties are SDPs the CHES will be used.

The MP codes party manifestos before every national parliamentary election. This means that the coded years in the MP follow a different lapse than the ESS, which is carried out every two years. In order to harmonise the time, if in an ESS-year there is no corresponding data from the MP, I will use the coded party manifesto of the most recent elections. For example, in Italy there were no national elections in 2002, and consequently I will use the MP data from the parliamentary elections of 2001.

In addition, because the MP calculates the favourable mentions towards a party position as a percentage of the total coded mentions, the values are not distributed on an ordinal Likert scale similar to those of the ESS or other surveys. Instead, the values are coded on the interval/ratio level and start at the value '0', which implies that a party does not have favourable mentions towards a certain party position in their manifesto at all. Every higher value demonstrates the relative percentage of favourable mentions in the manifesto. The theoretical maximum is the value '100', which implies that all of the coded sentences of the manifesto are favourable mentions towards a party position.

3.2.3 Chapel Hill Expert Survey and Comparative Political Parties Dataset

The CHES is an expert survey which incorporates the ideological positions of political parties in almost all EU member states. The survey is based on four core items: party positions on the left-right dimension, party positions on the economic left-right dimension, party positions on the GAL (green/alternative/libertarian)-TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) dimension and party positions on European integration (Bakker et al., 2012). Nevertheless, as CHES had simply too many missing values on the indicators of interest, I preferred the MP over the CHES as the main source for measuring party positions. For characterizing SDPs I however chose to use the CHES anyway, because my own definition of a SDP did not correspond with the parties that were included in the social democratic party family in the MP (as discussed in the previous subsection).

The CPPD, developed by Swank (2013), is a comprehensive database of political parties that includes information about party votes and party seats across 21 countries over the period 1950-2011. The CPPD classifies parties in several categories (such as left, right, Christian democratic, secular, radical right-wing populist and left-libertarian) and enables it to infer quickly how much votes, seats and cabinet portfolios certain types of parties had in a given year for a given country. I will use the CPPD for determining which parties qualify as PRRPs and if these PRRPs have been electorally strong or weak.

3.3 Operationalization

3.3.1 Dependent variable: Voting for SDPs

In this thesis, the dependent variable is *voting for SDPs*. This is measured by taking the indicator 'Party voted for in last elections', which is included for every country for every

round[7]. The respondents vote voted for SDPs are coded as '1' and those who voted for other parties are coded as '0', including the blank votes. Respondents who did not indicate to have voted for a specific party were coded as missing. *Voting for SDPs* is a dichotomous variable with a nominal measurement level.

3.3.2 Independent variables: Micro variables

To measure people's *social class*, I will use the EGP-class scheme, which has been developed by Erikson, Goldthorp and Portocarero (1979). The EGP is the most widely accepted international standard for determining people's socioeconomic status. It can be calculated by considering occupational information and employment status (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996). In the ESS these occupational measures are indicated by the ISCO-indicator. The ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations) is developed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and makes it possible to compare occupational information across different countries (ILO, 2010).

For the last two ESS rounds, a newer version of the ISCO, the ISCO-08 is used, while the first five rounds use the older ISCO-88. As a result, the ISCO-08 standard for round six and seven was coded back to ISCO-88, and then all the seven rounds were combined in one indicator for measuring social class.

The EGP class indicator is an ordinal variable that has ten values, ranging from '1' (higher controllers) to '10' (farm labours). However, in the literature such a detailed distinction between the classes is not often made. Moreover, for being able to test my hypotheses, it is essential to be more specific about the different social classes.

[7] In Germany voters have two columns to vote for on their ballot papers. With the first column a person can vote for a candidate in his/her electoral district to have a seat in the 'Bundestag', the German parliament. The second column allows a person to vote for a political party to have seats in parliament (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2011, 382). I have decided only to look at the second column votes because these are the most crucial for determining how many seats a party will have in the national parliament.

Therefore the EGP indicator with eleven values has been reduced to two dummy variables: one for the *middle class* (values '3', '4' and '5' of the EGP) and one for the *top class* (values '1' and '2'of the EGP). Both dummies have the working class (values '6' and '7' of the EGP) as a reference group.

It has been shown in the theoretical framework that *insiders* are wage-earners with protected jobs, while *outsiders* are workers who enjoy low levels of job protection or are unemployed. In the ESS, insiders are measured by looking at the type of employment contract (indicator 'wrkctr' in the ESS). Insiders are citizens that have a contract for an unlimited duration. Outsiders are measured by looking at the employment status and the type of employment contract. Outsiders are citizens that are unemployed (indicators 'uempla' and 'uempli' in the ESS) or have a job with a fixed-term contract. The indicator *outsiders* is a dummy variable on the nominal level. The value '0' represents the insiders and the value '1' the outsiders.

People's positive attitudes towards cultural liberalism will be measured in the ESS by looking at the item 'Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish'. This variable will be treated as interval-like and runs from '0' (strongly disagree) to '4' (strongly agree). People's attitudes towards gay lifestyle do not exhaust the concept of cultural liberalism, but unfortunately it is the only indicator in the ESS dataset that can be grouped under this concept. Moreover, cultural liberalism was measured by the same item in the ESS by Dolezal and Hutter (2012) as well. These scholars introduced cultural liberalism as one of the three relevant cultural issues regarding the integration-demarcation cleavage theory.

People's positive attitudes towards European integration are operationalized by taking the variable 'people's trust in the European parliament' as a proxy. The ESS does incorporate a direct indicator for measuring people's attitudes towards European

integration, but this indicator was not included in the first and the fifth round. Therefore I have chosen for a proxy variable instead. The direct variable and the proxy variable correlate with a score of .353 that is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Although this correlation is considerably low, 'people's trust in the European parliament' comes the closest to the original variable. Since the alternative would be to lose data for two rounds on this variable, I have decided to use 'people's trust in the European parliament' as a proxy variable for People's *positive attitudes towards European integration* anyway. The result is an interval-like variable that runs from '0' (No trust in the European parliament at all) until '10' (Very high trust in the European parliament).

Lastly, *People's positive opinions about immigration* are indicated by the interval-like variable 'Immigrants make country worse or better place to live', which scores from '0' (worse place to live) to '10' (better place to live). It can be expected that those people who are of the opinion that immigrants enrich a country as a place to live are more positive about immigration overall.

3.3.3 Independent variables: Macro variables

In the theoretical framework it was recognised that economic liberalization policy includes the promotion of deregulation, free trade, the elimination of subsidies and price controls, and the privatisation and downsizing of public services (Woodward, 1992). In the MP the variable *favourable mentions towards economic liberalization policies* is measured by looking at the extent to which a party in its manifesto refers favourably to the free market and market capitalism. This includes positive positions towards a laissez-faire economy and the superiority of individual enterprises over state and control system (MP, 2015). Therefore, it can be expected that the higher the score on this indicator, the more parties will favour economic liberalization policies. This variable

has an interval/ratio scale which starts at '0' (no favourable mentions towards economic liberalization policies) and can theoretically run to '100' (all coded mentions in the party manifesto are favourable mentions towards economic liberalization policies). It therefore represents the relative percentage of favourable mentions towards economic liberalization policies in the party manifesto.

The positive party positions on employment protection will be measured by using a proxy variable: the party positions on market regulation. The MP lacks a variable that directly measures party positions on employment protection. This is however not a problem, since it has been claimed by several scholars that indicators for employment protection policies tend to be highly correlated (correlation of 0.73 significant at 1% level) with those for product market regulation (Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud, 1999). Countries with strongly regulated product markets are very likely to have a high level of employment protection and vice versa (ibid., 1999). Because of this high correlation, it can be assumed that this correlation works not only on the country level, but also on the level of political parties. This variable is measured on the interval/ratio level as well. It starts at the value '0' (no favourable mentions towards product market regulation) and can theoretically run to '100' (all coded mentions in the party manifesto are favourable mentions towards product market regulation). The variable represents the relative percentage of favourable mentions towards employment protection in the party manifesto.

Positive party positions on cultural liberalism in the MP will be measured by parties' negative positions on traditional morality. Parties who have higher values on this variable oppose traditional/religious moral values, and thus they are more likely to support cultural liberalism. This variable is measured on the interval/ratio level. It starts at the value '0' (no favourable mentions towards cultural liberalism) and can

theoretically run to '100' (all coded mentions in the party manifesto are favourable mentions towards cultural liberalism). It represents the relative percentage of favourable mentions towards cultural liberalist policies in the party manifesto.

Positive party positions on European integration are measured in the MP by the indicator that measures the favourable mentions towards the European community. This variable is also measured on the interval/ratio level. It starts at the value '0' (no favourable mentions towards European integration) and can theoretically run to '100' (all coded mentions in the party manifesto are favourable mentions towards European integration). It represents the relative percentage of favourable mentions towards European integration in the party manifesto.

The MP includes a variable for measuring *positive party positions on immigration* issues, which is called 'National Way of Life: Immigration: Positive'. However, this category has been introduced very recently and as a result only two out of eighteen countries have a registered value on this variable. Therefore, *positive party positions on immigration* policies in the MP will not be measured by 'National Way of Life: Immigration: Positive', but by the original variable on which new category has been based, 'National Way of Life: Negative'. This indicator includes the negative mentions of a country's nation, history and pride in the party manifesto and may include opposition against nationalism and patriotism. Again, this macro variable is measured on the interval/ratio level. It starts at the value '0' (no unfavourable mentions towards a country's national way of life) can theoretically run to '100' (all coded mentions in the party manifesto are unfavourable mentions towards a country's national way of life). The variable represents the relative percentage of unfavourable mentions towards country's national way of life in the party manifesto.

In the literature it was recognised that PRRPs share a core ideology that includes at least three characteristics: nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2013). Furthermore, for testing the hypotheses it is necessary to distinguish between countries where PRRPs have been electorally strong over the past years, and countries where PRRPs have been weak. In order to make this distinction, I will use Mudde's (2013) operationalization of strong and weak PRRPs. He perceives *strong PRRPs* as those parties who have attained at least 5 percent or more in at least two consecutive parliamentary elections (ibid., 2013).

In order to determine which parties qualify as a PRRP and in which country these parties have been strong, the Comparative Political Parties Dataset (CPPD) which is developed by Swank (2013), will be used. This dataset is appropriate because it includes both the classifications[8] and the vote share of political parties across Europe over a longer period of time. However, the most recent election data included in the CPPD comes from the year 2011. To determine the vote share of the parties of interest after 2011 I used data from the Political Data Yearbook compiled by the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR, 2016). With the help of both sources I have established that Austria, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland are countries where PRRPs have been strong over the whole time period of interest (2002-2014) for this thesis. Belgium and Greece are special cases. In Belgium, PRRPs have been strong only after three of the five elections that are concerned. Over the periods 1999-2002 and 2010-2014 Belgium has not had a strong PRRP. In Greece, a PRRP has only been strong once (period 2012-2014).

[8] Swank (2013) does not classify the relevant parties as populist *radical* right parties (PRRPS), but as populist right-wing parties. Nevertheless, after comparing the parties Swank classified as populist right-wing with the parties Mudde (2013) classified as PRRPs, it turned out that both classifications are almost identical.

Nevertheless, Iceland is not included in Swank's (2013) dataset. Therefore I did a literature study which revealed that according to the Icelandic scholar Bergmann (2015), since 2008 the Icelandic right-wing 'Progressive Party' (PP) can be considered to be a PRRP. As a result of this, Iceland had a strong PRRP over the period 2009-2014 as well[9].

The countries with a *strong PRRP* will be given the value '1', while the countries with a weak PRRP or no PRRP at all are given the value '0'. This produces a dummy variable on the nominal level. An overview of the parties that were coded as PRRP and the years in which these parties have been strong or weak can be found in the tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix.

Left-wing populists, in contrast to PRRPs who mostly stress cultural issues, combine populist politics with a strong emphasis on economic issues and a very leftist economic position (March, 2007). For classifying these parties there was no ready-to-use dataset available. Consequently, I carried out a literature study about Western European left-wing populist parties. Again, the starting point is that strong left-wing populist parties should have attained at least 5 percent or more in at least two consecutive parliamentary elections (cf. Mudde, 2013).

My literature study resulted in five European countries where left-wing populist parties were or are present in the party system. Of these five countries, only three have known a left-wing populist party that has managed to have a minimal vote share of 5 percent in two successive elections: Germany, Netherlands and Greece. First, in Germany, left-wing populist parties were strong during the period 2009-2014. Second,

[9] The classification of the Icelandic 'Progressive Party' as a PRRP could be confirmed by Ravik Jupskås (2016). Ravik Jupskås is a Norwegian scholar who is an expert in the field of Nordic politics and right-wing populism. I asked him about his opinion about the PP by e-mail. A copy of the e-mail (and the response of Ravik Jupskås) can be found in section A8 of the appendix.

in the Netherlands they have been strong over a longer period: 2003-2014. Third, in Greece, left-wing populist parties have only been strong over the period 2012-2014.

The countries with a *strong left-wing populist party* are given the value '1', while the countries with a weak or no left-wing populist party are given the value '0'. This produces a dummy variable on the nominal level. An overview of the left-wing populist parties per country, the sources for coming to this classification and the years in which these parties have been strong or weak can be found in the tables A.4 and A.5 in the appendix.

3.3.4 Control variables

In the statistical models I will control for two personal characteristics: gender and age and level of education. *Gender* is indicated in the ESS by the dichotomous variable 'gndr'. The value '0' represents the male respondents, and '1' represents the female respondents.

Age is indicated by the interval/ratio variable 'agea'. Since in all of the countries of interest people who are younger than 18 are not elegible to vote, I have omitted those respondents that were younger than 18. Therefore this indicator has a minimum of '18'.

People's level of education is measured by people's highest level of education on the ISCED. The ISCED is the International Standard Classification of Education which facilitates making comparisons of education across countries (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, n.d.). The ISCED scale runs from '1' to '7'. The value '1' means that a person has finished less than lower secondary education, while '7' represents higher tertiary education (MA level or higher). In order to simplify interpreting the effect of education in the statistical models I computed two dummy variables representing three different groups: the lower educated (values '1'and '2' of the ISCED), the intermediate educated

(values '3', '4' and '5'of the ISCED) and the higher educated (values '6' and '7' of the ISCED).

Furthermore, in the models where the three cultural issues (immigration, cultural liberalism and European integration) are included, I will control for people's attitudes towards welfare policies. It has been shown in the theoretical framework that cultural issues constitute only one dimension according to the integration-demarcation cleavage theory. The other dimension is marked by economic issues. Of these economic issues people's attitudes towards welfare state policies have proven to be the most influential by far. By controlling for these attitudes, I will check whether the effects of the three cultural issues hold when they are combined with attitudes towards economic issues.

People's positive attitudes towards welfare policies will be measured in the ESS by the interval-like indicator 'Government should reduce differences in income levels. Although welfare policies go further than just income inequality, the ESS does unfortunately not include more suitable indicators to measure personal attitudes on welfare issues. The possible values on this ordinal variable run from '0' (strongly disagree) to '4' (strongly agree).

3.4 Research methods

3.4.1 Multiple regression

In order to test the hypotheses, the effects of independent variables on the dependent variables have to be estimated. The most common statistical method for doing this is multiple regression analysis. Multiple regression, also referred to as ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, essentially estimates the average effect of the independent variables (X's) on a dependent variable (Y). The method can be used for predicting outcomes and for investigating the causes of outcomes (Allison, 1999,1). OLS regression

is based on several assumptions about how the values of Y follow from the X's. When one or more of these assumptions are violated, the results may be biased and unreliable (ibid., 1999, 122).

First, OLS regression assumes linearity, which means that the Y is a linear function of each of the X's plus a random disturbance ε. In formula terms this would be:

$$Y = \beta_0+\beta_1X_1+\beta_2X_2\ldots\ldots+\beta_kX_k+\varepsilon \qquad (1.1)$$

In formula 1.1, β_0 is the intercept, the value of Y when all X's is 0. The part $\beta_1X_1+\beta_2X_2\ldots\ldots+\beta_kX_k$ consists of the slopes, that show how Y changes for every unit increase in X. This is not limited to only one X, since multiple regression always includes more X's. ε is the disturbance term, which is the random noise that disturbs the relationship between Y and X.

The second assumption requires the average value of ε not to depend on the X's. The mean value of ε is always 0. Third, homoscedasticity is required. This means that the variance of ε does not depend on the X's. Fourth, OLS regression assumes uncorrelated disturbances, which means that the value of ε for every case does not correlate with the value of ε for other cases. Fifth, it is assumed that ε is normally distributed (Allison, 1999, 122-123).

3.4.2 Logistic regression

I am interested in the influence of several factors on the probabilities (ρ) that people will vote for SDPs. Thus, the dependent variable Y is a binary one: it can either be 1 (voting for SDPs) or 0 (not voting for SDPs). This implicates that the first assumption of OLS regression is likely not to be satisfied as most of the time, a binary dependent variable

will not be linearly related to the X's. Additionally, assuming a linear function in this case could lead to predicted probabilities that fall outside the scope of 0 to 1, which would produce results that are very difficult to interpret because the probabilities for voting on SDPs can only be 0 or 1 (DeMaris, 1995). Furthermore, using a dichotomous dependent variable for OLS regression has as a consequence that it is likely to assume that the disturbance depends on the X's, that heteroscedasticity will occur (ibid., 1995) and that the random disturbance ε is not normally distributed, which violates the second, third and fifth assumption as well.

To solve these problems, instead of using an OLS regression model, one can use a logistic regression model (also called logit model). A very common method for transforming the dependent variable is taking the logarithm of the odds. The odds are the probabiliites (ρ) that Y will be 1 divided by the chances that Y is not 1 (DeMaris, 1995). A logistic regression model belongs to the family of generalized linear models (GLMs). GLMs allow for incorporating nonlinear relationships into multiple regression models. This is done by transforming a non-linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables into a linear relationship (Allison, 1999, 154).

In contrast to OLS regression, a logit model does not calculate absolute changes (ibid., 1999, 154). For example, in an OLS regression model, every unit increase in the independent variable X will lead to an absolute change in Y. From a logit model, such assumptions cannot be made. Rather, what can be said is how for every unit change in X, the ρ that Y is 1 will change:

$$\log_n\left(\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 \ldots\ldots + \beta_k X_k \qquad (2.1)$$

From formula 2.1, it can be noticed that the error term is no longer included in the logit models. This is because in a logistic regression model it is assumed that Y=1 is binomially distributed. Therefore the error term is already included in the model, since there is no common error distribution independent of the X's.

Although using logistic regression has as an advantage that it prevents one from violating the assumptions of regression analysis, it also has one clear drawback: that it is often very difficult to interpret logistic regression estimates. As mentioned, the coefficients of a logistic regression model do not represent direct effects such as is the case in a linear regression model. They represent the log odds, a logarithm of the probabilities that the dependent variable Y=1 divided by the probabilities that Y≠1. To make the results more interpretable, one can of course display the odds, or convert the odds to probabilities. Even then, the interpretation remains problematic because these estimates only go under control of the rest of the independent variables. Furthermore, as a consequence of the fact that it is difficult to interpret the logistic regression estimates, the interpretation of interaction effects in logit models can be very tricky. It is very easy to go wrong when analysing the results of interaction variables in logit models. For this thesis interaction effects are highly important, since most of the hypotheses concern such an interaction effect.

According to Mood (2010), the most important reason for the problem that logistic regression estimates cannot be interpreted as effect measures is the fact that in logit models these estimates are seriously affected by unobserved variables that are not included in the models. Just like correlating independent variables, in logit models these unobserved variables can correlate with the included variables as well, possibly resulting in biased results. Consequently, we have to be very careful with attributing actual effects to logit model results. Mood (2010) also provides several solutions. One

commonly used method is the calculation of marginal effects. This means that one calculates how the probabilities that P(Y=1) differ for a change in the estimates of independent variable X, given a set value of the other independent variables. A further advantage of this method is that it is also makes the data easier to interpret comparing to analysing odds or log odds (Mood, 2010).

3.4.3 Multilevel regression

However, only using a regular logistic regression model is not enough for not violating any assumption in this thesis. The ESS dataset has a nested data structure, which means nothing more than that the respondents are hierarchical clustered in groups. In this case, the respondents represent the micro-level and countries and years that are included in the ESS represent the macro-level. In which country a respondent lives and in what year that person was asked to participate with the survey is often very influential for the answers that one provides on the survey questions.

Therefore, when doing a regular (logit) analysis, this nested data structure has as a consequence that it cannot be assumed anymore that the errors are uncorrelated. In a situation where the data is not nested, the variance of the errors will be independently distributed along the regression line. Conversely, with nested data the errors will correlate with the other errors that belong to the same group. Scholars often refer to nested data as multilevel data.

Moreover approximately half of the hypotheses that were drawn in the previous chapter concern a cross-level interaction. Party positions are macro variables because these will be the same for every citizen of a particular country. On the contrary, personal attitudes, beliefs and characteristics are different for every respondent in the survey and therefore they are micro variables. When the effect of a macro variable in a micro

variable relationship is tested in a single model, then we speak of measuring a cross-level interaction. Problematic then is the fact that every respondent in the dataset will have the same value for a macro variable as the other respondents that belong to that group. Again, this will have as a consequence that the errors are not distributed independently.

What is actually happening when the errors correlate because of a nested data structure is that the within-group and between-group variance are getting mixed up. The within-group variance is often referred to as the intraclass correlation. When the intraclass correlation is too high, it is very likely that because of the standard errors which are smaller than they actually should be, the results will be overly significant (Hox, 2010). This highly increases the likelihood of making a type 1 error which occurs when, although in reality there is no significant relationship between two or more variables, it is claimed that there is an effect anyway.

A possible solution to the problem of intraclass correlation is the inclusion of dummy variables of the higher-level groups in the models. Such a model is called a fixed effects model. This entails that I would have to create a dummy variable for every country and include those in the regression models. However, this is highly inefficient as every single model would require including seventeen dummy variables on top of the variables at interest. Moreover, such an approach would make it impossible to estimate effects of macro-level variables, since a model with dummy variables does not allow for estimating the effects of variables that do not vary within countries. For this thesis that is highly problematic, since estimating the effects of macro-level variables (in the form of party positions) is needed for testing more than half of the hypotheses.

Another possibility is not using a fixed effects model, but a random effects model. This model, also known as a multilevel model, splits the unexplained variance in two

parts: a fixed term and a random term. Splitting the variance into different parts allows it to estimate each of these components separately, which prevents the between-group and within-group variance from getting entangled. In the most basic form, this looks like the following:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{1ij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij} \qquad (3.1)$$

In formula 3.1, Y_{ij} is the dependent variable. i represents one individual case on level 1, while j refers to a group on level 2. Here, i are the respondents and j the countries. γ_{00} is the intercept, which is the average value of Y_{ij} when $\gamma_{10}X_{1ij}$ is 0. $\gamma_{10}X_{1ij}$ refers to effect of the independent variable X_1 in every group. Because of simplicity, in this formula there is only one X included, more covariates can be included. u_{0j} represents the between-group variance on level 2, while e_{ij} demonstrates the within-group variance on level 1. It is assumed that u_{0j} and e_{ij} are both normally distributed[10]. It can be noticed that compared with a regular OLS regression model, instead of β_0 the intercept is now denoted by γ_{00}, while the coefficients are no longer denoted by β_1 but by γ_{10}. The reason behind this change in the notation is the fact that in a multilevel model, the intercept has a fixed part (γ_{00}) and a random part (u_{0j}). For the sake of clarity both terms have to be displayed in the model.

The term $\gamma_{10}X_{1ij}$ implies that we are dealing with a microlevel effect. It is also possible to imagine a model in which we are interested in a macrolevel effect. Such an effect can be indicated in a formula by including the term $\gamma_{01}W_{1j}$, where W indicates that we are dealing with a macrolevel covariate:

[10] In a formula, this can be indicated as $u_{0j} \sim (0, \sigma_{u0}^2)$ and $e_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_r^2)$.

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}W_{1j} + u_{0j} + e_{ij} \qquad (3.2)$$

Nevertheless, the formulas as displayed above only represent the situation when dealing with random intercept fixed slope models. In this model it is expected that, although the individual respondents i in the countries j have a different intercept, that is they have different levels for when $\gamma_{10}X_{1ij}$ is 0, they share a similar slope. However, it is also possible that in some countries j, the effects of $\gamma_{10}X_{1ij}$ on Y_{ij} will be different than in other countries j. For example, in some countries j these effects can be positive, while in other countries the effect could be negative. This is what we call 'causal heterogeneity'. For estimating models in which causal heterogeneity is present, random intercept random slope models can be used. In contrast with a random intercept fixed slope model, a random intercept random slope model includes the additional random term $u_{1j}X_{ij}$. This term represents the variance of the intercepts between the people in the different countries:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{1ij} + u_{0j} + u_{1j}X_{ij} + e_{ij} \qquad (3.3)$$

Furthermore, as mentioned before, in this thesis several cross-level interaction effects will be tested. A cross-level interaction is characterized by an interaction effect of a level 2 variable W on the level 1 relationship between X and Y. The following formula 3.4 is an example of a model with such a cross-level interaction effect.

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}W_j + \gamma_{10}X_{1ij} + \gamma_{11}W_jX_{ij} + u_{0j} + u_{1j}X_{ij} + e_{ij} \qquad (3.4)$$

In comparison with formula 3.3, model 3.4 has two additional terms: $\gamma_{01}W_j$ and $\gamma_{11}W_jX_{ij}$. $\gamma_{01}W_j$ is part of the intercept of W, which is the effect of W when the average score on X is 0. The term $\gamma_{11}W_jX_{ij}$ shows how the slope of X will change if W changes. This model thus allows it to incorporate cross-level interaction effects.

Yet, to make it even more complicated, the respondents are not only nested in countries, but also in years as I use longitudinal ESS data. This means that in addition to the terms that have already been included in the models 3.1 and 3.2 for measuring a micro or macro effect, the term V_{00t} for determining the random parameter of t (time) has to be added, and the notations of several other terms have to be changed. The following model is an example of a three-level model:

$$Y_{ijt} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{100}X_{1ijt} + V_{00t} + u_{0jt} + e_{ijt} \quad (3.5)$$

When adding the time level to the cross-level interaction as displayed in model 3.4, the following formula can be established:

$$Y_{ijt} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{01}W_j + \gamma_{100}X_{1ijt} + \gamma_{11}W_jX_{ijt} + V_{00t} + u_{0jt} + u_{1jt}X_{ijt} + e_{ijt} \quad (3.6)$$

To complete the model as it will be used in this thesis, it is necessary to combine the multilevel approach with a logit regression model. This is done by taking the logarithm of the odds that Y =1. When taking the function 3.5 as an example, this would lead to the following formula:

$$\log_n\left(\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}\right) = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{100}X_{1ijt} + V_{00t} + u_{0jt}$$

Now I have explained the basics of multilevel regression analysis and its application in this thesis, I have two more remarks to make. First, multilevel regression models nevertheless have underlying assumptions as well, which are similar to those for ordinary regression models. Multilevel regression assumes a linear relationship, homoscedasticity and a normal distribution of the standard errors (Maas and Hox, 2003). Furthermore, multilevel analysis requires a large sample size. The lower the number of groups on the second level, the higher the likelihood that the standard errors for the regression coefficients may appear lower than they are in fact (ibid., 2003).

Second, it is important to understand that as any other method, multilevel regression analysis has its disadvantages as well. The most important one which is relevant for this thesis is that a multilevel model is much more complicated to compute than a singlelevel one. This is due to the large number of parameters that has to be calculated in a multilevel model in comparison with a singlelevel model. As a result, exploring multilevel models may lead to computational problems where the model is simply too complex to compute (Hox, 2010, 54-55). There are several tricks in order to get a complex model computed anyway, although they do not always work either. One of them is using the starting value estimates of less complex models for the more complex one, or increasing the number of integration points.

3.4.4 Recap

To summarise the previous three subsections, in order to test the hypotheses in this thesis I will use a multilevel logistic regression analysis. A multilevel approach has the advantage that it can disentangle the between country and year variance, a situation which otherwise may lead to biased regression coefficients. The main disadvantage of this approach is that it makes models very complex and time-consuming to compute.

The most important reason to choose for a logistic regression modelling is the fact that the independent variable, *voting for SDPs*, is a dichotomous variable. Again, if I would not correct for this it may be possible that the regression results will be biased. A drawback of a logistic regression approach is that the interpretation of the regression coefficients in a logistic model can be quite tricky.

3.5 Data structure and centering

In the previous sections I have explained why I have chosen to use a multilevel logistic regression method. I have also shown that the individuals in the ESS are nested in both countries and years and as a result I will use a three-level model. For the actual analysis, it is however important clarify the way the random effects in the multilevel models are structured.

When dealing with individuals that are nested in countries as well as years, it does not go without saying that a three-level model is required. This is always dependent on the structure of the data nesting. For instance, in such a situation one can also choose to work with a two-level model in which level two consists of a country-year variable. Such a structure then treats the time-invariant country-level variable as a time-varying one (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother, 2016). In doing so, however, it ignores the fact that individuals within a particular country are more likely to show similarities than individuals between different countries. Therefore, I have decided to use a country-year variable on level two, but nested in countries on level three. This kind of a multilevel structure enables it to recognise the clustering of respondents from the same country, but also the clustering of respondents from the same country in the same year, since it can be expected that those respondents will have more in common than respondents from the same country but in a different year (ibid., 2015). In addition, this structure

ignores the clustering of respondents from all countries within years, since it can be expected that in which country a respondents lives is more influential than the year in which the survey was conducted. All in all, this leads to the following multilevel structure:



Figure 3.1: Multilevel structure

A last point of consideration is centering. Centering is a technique which can be used to correct for the fact that when dealing with random slopes, the values of the intercepts of the independent variables Xs is dependent on how the variables are scaled (Hox, 2010, 59-60). Because the relative difference between the random slopes will vary for different values of X, interpreting the spread of the intercepts can be quite difficult in such a situation. Furthermore, the intercept of an independent variable X is often not meaningful, because the value '0' is not always a possible value. For example, the variable for gender has often the values '1' and '2' for representing females and males. In such a situation the intercept is meaningless, as the value '0' does not exist (ibid., 2010,

61). A possible solution could be to make the value '0' meaningful again by subtracting 1 from both values. However, a more efficient method is to center such a variable.

Centering is nothing more than subtracting the overall mean of the independent variables from all the values of a variable (ibid., 2010). This is called grand mean centering. Another possibility is to center not according to the grand mean of the variables but to the group means (also referred to as within-cluster centering) (Enders and Tofighi, 2007).

In this thesis, centering will be used, but this use is limited to the random intercepts random slopes models. All of the variables of interest have a meaningful value of '0', including the dummy variables. Therefore, in fixed slopes models centering would not be very helpful. However, for the random slopes models that follow from the cross-level interaction hypotheses, centering is absolutely necessary to prevent the scaling of the independent variables of having an effect on the estimates. The type of scaling that will be used is group mean centering, since group mean centering is more appropriate to use for cross-level interactions that concern two micro-level variables (Enders and Tofighi, 2007).

Chapter 4: Analysis

In this chapter the hypotheses that were drawn in the theoretical framework will be tested using a multilevel logistic approach as demonstrated in the previous chapter. First, the chapter will start with a presentation of descriptive values of the variables that are going to be used. Second, the vote share that SDPs have received over the period 2002-2014 will be discussed. Subsequently several statistical models will be presented to explore the relationship between voting for SDPs and the variables that have been operationalised in the previous chapter. Lastly, the chapter will end with a critical discussion of the results and the used methods.

4.1 Descriptives

In table 4.1, all the operationalized variables are summarised together with an overview of their descriptive statistics. For most of the variables the valid N, minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation are presented. For the dummy variables I included the percentage of the relevant group as part of the total valid N. In the following paragraphs the most important features will be shortly discussed. Table 4.1 shows that the amount of women and men included in the ESS is in the balance, with a slight overhang to women. The average age is 47 and the largest group of respondents has finished an education of the intermediate level.

Table 4.1: Descriptive values of the control variables, dependent variable and independent variables

Variable:	*Valid N*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*	*Mean / percentage*	*Standard deviation*
Women (ref: men) (dummy)	197833	0	1	51.50%	
Age	197885	18	123	47.56	17.93
Educational level (dummies)	196886	0	1		
Low (reference)				36.86%	
Intermediate				38.84%	
High				24.30%	
Attitude towards welfare issues	194429	0	4	2.78	1.05
Voted for SDP (dummy)	126746	0	1	30.49%	
Social class (dummies)	173746	0	1		
Working class (reference)				28.94%	
Middle class				32.87%	
Top class				38.19%	
Outsiders (reference: insiders)	155361	0	1	28.65%	
Attitude towards cultural liberalism	193951	0	4	3.03	1.04
Attitude towards European integration	179763	0	10	4.45	2.37
Attitude towards immigration policies	192774	0	10	4.96	2.28
PPs on economic liberalization policies	191420	0	4.81	0.51	0.74
PPs on employment protection	191420	0	15.49	3.81	3.26
PPs on cultural liberalism	191420	0	3.79	0.37	0.65
PPs on European integration	191420	0	11.54	2.14	1.45
PPS on immigration policies	191420	0	0.77	0.08	0.19
Strong right-wing populist parties (dummy)	197886	0	1	36.83%	
Strong left-wing populist parties (dummy	197886	0	1	9.73%	

Regarding the independent variable 'voted for SDP', 30.5 percent of the people indicated to have voted for an SDP in the most recent national parliamentary election. The variable has a valid N of 126.746, which is significantly lower than the other variables, such as the control variables for age and gender that have a valid N of almost 200.000 respondents. This difference can be explained by the fact that on top of the people who decided not to vote, a significant amount of respondents failed to indicate for which party they had voted.

Concerning the independent variables it can be seen that the top class is better represented in the ESS than the middle and working class, and that there are significantly more insiders than outsiders in the sample. The insider-outsider variable has a higher amount of missing values than most of the other indicators, which can be explained by the fact that one can only be an insider or outsider if a person has joined the labour market and is not a student or retired. Students and retirees form a notable part of the sample and therefore the insider-outsider indicator has more missing values on average.

Regarding the individual attitudes, most people have a positive attitude regarding cultural liberalism. On a scale from '0' to '4', the average value is '3.03'. Considering attitudes towards European integration and immigration, the mean values revolve around '4,5'-'5'. Because these two variables have a scale that runs from '0' to '10', it can be concluded that on average people are slightly more negative than positive about these two issues.

The macro variables are the same for every citizen of a specific country. However, in contrast to the two variables for populist parties, the indicators for the SDP positions on several policy issues have around 6000 missing values more. This can be explained by the fact that the MP had a small number of missing manifestos for some countries.

The indicator for the SDP positions furthermore show that SDPs in Western Europe are relatively unified in their positions on immigration issues (average score of just 0.08), whereas the discord is the highest on employment protection issues (average score of 3.81) and European integration issues (average score of 2.14).

Furthermore, 36.8 percent of the respondents live in a country where a PRRP was strong in a given year. Concerning the populist left-wing parties this is much less with 9.7 percent.

4.2 Electoral Support for SDPs over the period 2002-2014

Before the hypotheses will be tested to gain insight in why people vote for SDPs, I will first give a brief overview of how SDPs fared in the eighteen Western European countries of interest considering their levels of electoral support.

Figure 4.1 demonstrates the mean electoral support for SDPs in Western Europe over the period 2002-2014, calculated with the ESS data on voting for SDPs. This graph shows a clear decline in the mean vote share of SDPs. Whereas in 2002 the mean electoral support was 32 percent, in 2014 this figure has decreased to 25.4 percent. As a result, the average decline in the social democratic vote share in this 12-year period is almost 7 percentage points. From 2002 until 2008 the electoral support remains fairly steady, but especially after 2008 a large drop can be noticed.



Figure 4.1: Mean electoral support for SDPs in 18 Western European countries, 2002-2014
Source: ESS (2002-2014)

From table 4.2 it can be seen that at the country level, the most striking results come from a number of Scandinavian countries. In either Denmark, Finland as Sweden, the mean electoral support for SDPs in 2014 in comparison with 2002 has decreased with about 10 percentage points. SDPs in the UK and Switzerland saw the strongest decline with respectively 13.9 and 13 percentage points. In most other countries a decrease can be noticed as well.

However, there were also two countries in which the electoral support for SDPs increased. Norway diverges from the other Scandinavian countries, as the Norwegian social democratic vote share has increased with almost 8 percentage points. And in Italy, the electoral support for SDPs in 2012 was 10 percentage points higher than in 2002.

Table 4.2: Mean electoral support for SDPs in 18 Western European countries, 2002-2014

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Average
Austria	34.0	32.7	33.7	n/a	n/a	32.9	n/a	33.3
Belgium	23.1	30.7	26.3	26.8	25.2	25.5	22.6	25.7
Denmark	31.7	27.0	27.7	27.8	24.6	27.9	22.5	27.0
Finland	28.2	26.5	28.6	22.9	20.1	18.3	17.6	23.2
France	36.5	35.7	34.2	33.6	28.8	37.2	30.9	33.8
Germany	35.7	36.8	36.9	32.6	27.8	28.7	29.7	32.6
Greece	n/a	30.3	n/a	n/a	n/a	27.7	n/a	42.9
Iceland	11.9	10.3	8.1	10.3	15.4	16.5	10.3	29.0
Ireland	26.7	25.8	n/a	n/a	n/a	36.5	n/a	11.8
Italy	29.1	21.8	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	29.7
Luxembourg	16.1	26.1	24.5	22.2	18.9	22.8	14.8	25.4
Netherlands	24.8	28.7	32.9	37.5	36.8	37.5	32.3	20.8
Norway	39.3	38.7	32.0	35.5	26.0	30.1	31.3	32.9
Portugal	30.3	24.2	25.2	22.0	22.3	17.0	18.1	43.2
Spain	47.6	49.7	43.2	43.5	32.0	35.6	33.4	43.2
Sweden	49.4	32.3	n/a	41.5	48.4	n/a	n/a	33.3
Switzerland	39.1	43.1	51.9	52.7	42.1	39.1	34.6	22.7
UK	41.4	51.2	48.8	51.4	50.1	27.0	32.3	40.7

Source: ESS (2016)

The fact that especially after 2008 the electoral support for SDPs in most countries has strongly declined, suggests that the financial crisis that hit the world in that year has worked against the support for SDPs. According to Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2011), this can be explained by the fact that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a large number of European countries had voted SDPs into office. The policies that these parties had developed may be believed to have had an influence on the emergence of the financial crisis. Thus, because of their incumbency in the years before the financial crisis, voters may have punished SDPs.

Yet, the data in table 4.2 has been derived from the ESS and represents what people said they voted in the most recent parliamentary elections of that particular round. Therefore it does not necessarily correspond with the actual election results. The average deviation of the ESS results compared with the actual election results per election is 3.9 percent, either negative or positive (an overview of the actual official election results can be found under heading A.6 in the appendix). There are also quite a few outliers where the ESS results and the official results of a given year differ with more than 5 percent. Yet, this does not automatically imply that the ESS provides unreliable results, far from that. As I have marked the ESS results from a given election year *t* as the average score for that year without taking into account the actual interview dates, it might happen that the main question ('Which party did you vote for during the most recent national parliamentary elections?') in some cases does not refer to the year *t*, but to *t*-1 if the survey was conducted before the elections were held in the year *t*.

4.3 Null models

In the previous chapter I have provided the theoretical and methodological arguments for employing a multilevel approach. The first step of the analysis therefore will be to empirically test whether these theoretical expectations can be confirmed and if a multilevel approach is genuinely required. In order to do this, a likelihood ratio test will be conducted. This test enables it to determine whether a multilevel model is indeed necessary or if a single-level model fits the data just as well.

The likelihood ratio test (also referred to as the deviance test) compares the -2Log Likelihood (-2LL) of two given models (Hox, 2010, 48). When the difference in the -2LL is large, it is more likely that one of the two models, namely the one with the lowest -2LL value, has a better fit than the other model. This difference can then be tested by

performing a chi-square test. The chi-square test demonstrates if this difference is statistically significant or not.

To start, I have compared a level-1 null model which only includes an intercept with a multilevel (two-level) null model which includes only a random intercept, but where the respondents are nested in a land-year combination. The difference between the -2LL of these two models is 5951, which is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). This suggests that there is a significant between-country variance. Thus, it can be concluded that the multilevel null model fits the data better than the single-level null model. The intraclass correlation of this 2-level null model is 7.4 percent, which means that 7.4 percent of the total variance is made up by the within-group variance. This percentage is not very high, but it does show that a substantial part of the total variance is made up at the country-year level, which justifies a multilevel approach.

Thereafter, I have compared a two-level null model with a three-level logistic regression null model, in which the respondents are nested in country-years nested in years. The logistic regression results of this two- and three-level null models can be found in table 4.3 below. Once more, the more specified model which is the three-level one, shows the better fit. The difference in the -2LL between the two-level and the three-level model is 123.03 and is significant as well ($p < 0.05$). The intraclass correlation of the respondents nested in country-years (second-level) within countries (third-level) is 6.9 percent.

Table 4.3: Two- and three-level null model of voting for SDPs

	Two-level null model		Three-level null model	
	B	OR	B	OR
Constant	-0.877*** (0.050)	0.416	-0.866*** (0.105)	0.420
Total N	130443		130443	
Level-2 N	102		102	
Level-3 N			18	
-2LL	153881.72		153758.69	
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.263		0.059	
Country variance (level-3)			0.185	
ICC (country-years)	0.074			
ICC (country-years within countries)			0.069	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors are noted in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefficients.

4.4 Multilevel bivariate logistic regression

Table 4.4 demonstrates the results of the three-level bivariate logistic regression of the relevant independent variables on the dependent variable voting for SDPs. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it concerns a three-level model of respondents nested in country-years nested in countries.

It is shown that in comparison with the working class, the odds that people belonging to the middle class will vote for an SDP are 30.5 percent lower than the odds of the working class, while the odds that top class citizens vote for SDPs are 38.8 percent lower than the odds of working class citizens. This result is therefore in line with what was expected from hypothesis H1 (*Citizens belonging to the working class are more likely to vote for SDPs than citizens that belong to the middle class*).

Furthermore, the odds that an outsider will vote for a SDP are 30 percent lower than the odds for an insider to do so. This was expected from hypothesis H3 (*Insiders are more likely than outsiders to vote for SDPs*).

Table 4.4: Bivariate three-level logistic regression analysis of voting for SDPs

Independent variable	B	Odds Ratio
Social class (ref: working class)		
Middle class	-0.363*** (0.017)	0.695
Top class	-0.491*** (0.016)	0.612
Outsiders (ref: insiders)	-0.356*** (0.017)	0.700
Positive individual attitudes towards:		
Cultural liberalism	0.109*** (0.007)	1.115
European integration	0.035*** (0.003)	1.035
Immigration policies	0.042*** (0.003)	1.042
Welfare policies#	0.316*** (0.007)	1.371
Positive party positions on:		
Cultural liberalism	-0.184* (0.077)	0.823
European integration#	0.024 (0.031)	1.024
Immigration policies	0.257 (0.204)	1.293
Economic liberalization	0.101* (0.044)	1.106
Employment protection	-0.020 (0.011)	0.980
Strong PRRP in country	0.133 (0.139)	1.142
Strong left-wing populist party in country#	-0.305 (0.177)	0.718
Women (ref: men)	0.084*** (0.012)	1.087
Age	0.004*** (0.000)	1.004
Educational level (ref: low)	-0.025*** (0.004)	0.975
Intermediate	-0.263*** (0.016)	0.769
High	-0.465*** (0.017)	0.628

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors are noted in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefficients. #=calculated in a two-level model (respondents nested in country-years) due to computational problems.

The bivariate relationships between the personal attitudes towards cultural liberalism, European integration, immigration and welfare and the probability to vote for SDPs are all in line with what was expected from the hypotheses H5a, H5b and H5c (*The more positive attitude people have towards a) immigration, b) cultural liberalism and c) European integration, the more likely it is that they will vote for SDPs*) as well. Those citizens who have a more positive attitude towards cultural liberalism, favour a further European integration, are more positive towards immigration and prefer the government to reduce income differences with welfare policies have higher odds of

voting for SDPs. The control variable 'attitude towards welfare policies' is the most influential for determining the odds of voting for SDPs; with every increase on a scale from 1 to 5, the odds that someone will vote for an SDP increases with 37.1 percent.

Of the macro variables, the variable for the positive party positions towards cultural liberalism has a direct effect on the decision to vote for SDPs. For every value increase, the odds of voting for SDPs go down with 17.7 percent. It is striking that the macro-level variable for the party positions on cultural liberalism has a negative effect on voting for SDPs, whereas the micro-level variable for the individual attitudes on cultural liberalism has a positive effect. The variable for the positive party positions on economic liberalization policies has a significant direct effect on voting for SDPs as well. For every unit increase on this variable, the odds of voting for SDPs will increase with 10.6 percent in the bivariate model. Of the variables for the other party positions, none has a direct effect on voting for SDPs, although it must be noted that the variable for the party positions on employment protection is only just insignificant (p=0.079).

On the contrary to what was expected from hypotheses H7 (*In countries where PRRPs are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs*) and H9 (*In countries where left-wing populist parties are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs*), the presence of a strong PRRP or left-wing populist party in a country does not have a significant direct effect on voting for SDPs in the bivariate models. Yet, the variable that indicates whether a country has a strong left-wing populist party is only just insignificant (p=0.085).

Regarding the control variables, it can be seen that women have a slightly higher chance to vote for SDPs than men. The odds for women to vote for SDPs are 8.7 percent higher than the odds for men. Age is also positively related to voting for SDPs, since for every year increase in age, the odds of voting for SDPs increases with 0.4 percent. On the

other hand, education is negatively related with voting for SDPs. The odds of people with an intermediate educational level to vote for SDPs are 23.1 percent lower than the odds for people with a low educational level, and the odds of people with a high educational level to vote for SDPs are even 37.2 percent lower than the odds for people with a low educational level.

However, these results from table 4.4 are only true for their respective models, that is, a very simple bivariate model. In the next section I will test whether the effects that were noted hold when they are included in a more sophisticated statistical model.

4.5 Multilevel logistic regression analysis

4.5.1 Micro-level hypotheses

Before including more independent variables in one model, I controlled both the micro-level and macro-level independent variables for multicollinearity. Most of the VIF values are lower than 2 and the mean VIF is 1.44, which suggests that the degree of multicollinearity between the variables is reasonably low. Two dummy variables have a VIF value that is a bit higher, respectively the top class (2.24) and the higher educated (2.39). For the largest part this can be explained by a high correlation between these two variables itself. Nevertheless, as the VIF values of these two variables are only slightly higher, it is not seen as problematic. An overview of the multicollinearity statistics can be found in table A.7 in the appendix.

Table 4.5 shows the results of two three-level logistic regression models in which only the relevant variables for testing the micro-level hypotheses have been included. Model 1 demonstrates a model with three independent variables for social class and

insiders/outsiders, including the control variables. In model 2 the four personal attitudes have been added.

Table 4.5: Three-level logistic regression analysis of voting for SDPs.

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	OR	B	OR
Fixed effects				
Intercept	-0.544*** (0.101)	0.474	-2.199*** (0.111)	0.111
Women (ref: men)	0.080*** (0.015)	1.084	-0.004 (0.015)	0.999
Age	0.003*** (0.000)	1.003	0.004*** (0.001)	1.004
Educational level (ref: low)				
Intermediate	-0.211*** (0.020)	0.810	-0.229*** (0.021)	0.796
High	-0.358*** (0.023)	0.699	-0.417*** (0.025)	0.659
Social class (ref.: working class)				
Middle class	-0.250*** (0.020)	0.779	-0.244*** (0.022)	0.784
Top class	-0.327*** (0.020)	0.721	-0.309*** (0.022)	0.734
Outsiders (ref.: insiders)	-0.252*** (0.019)	0.777	-0.257*** (0.020)	0.774
Positive attitudes towards:				
Cultural liberalism			0.121*** (0.009)	1.129
European integration			0.045*** (0.004)	1.046
Immigration policies			0.052*** (0.004)	1.053
Welfare policies			0.283*** (0.008)	1.328
Random effects				
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.062		0.074	
Country variance (level-3)	0.151		0.157	
ICC (country-years within countries)	0.061		0.065	
-2LL	118986.18		106085.95	
Wald Chi-Square (df)	1461.86 (7)		3250.22 (11)	
Level-2 N	106		106	
Level-3 N	18		18	
Total N	100518		91826	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors are noted in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefficients.

The intraclass correlation of model 1 is 6.1 percent and that of model 2 is 6.5 percent. This means that respectively 6.1 percent and 6.5 percent of the total variance is made up because of the correlation of respondents in country-years in countries. Furthermore,

the -2LL of model 2 is lower than that of model 1, which means that model 2 has a better fit. This is not so strange since model 2 includes more significant independent variables.

As was expected from hypothesis H1 (*Citizens belonging to the working class are more likely to vote for SDPs than citizens that belong to the middle class*), the working class is more likely to vote for SDPs than the middle class. In the second model, the odds of voting for SDPs are 21.6 percent lower for the middle class than for the working class. In comparison with the working class, the top class is the least likely to vote for SDPS: the odds are 26.6 percent lower for the top class to vote for SDPs. This means that hypothesis H1 can be provisionally adopted. Moreover, the differences between the model with and without the addition of the individual attitudes are very small.

Hypothesis H3 (*Insiders are more likely than outsiders to vote for SDPs*) can also be adopted provisionally. From model 2, it can be seen that the odds for outsiders to vote for SDPs are 22.6 percent lower than those of insiders. Thus, insiders are more likely to vote for SDPs than outsiders. Again, adding the individual attitudes in the second model does not cause many changes in the previously observed effect.

Model 2 demonstrates that all of the four personal attitudes appear to have the effect on the probabilities to vote for SDPs which was expected from hypotheses H5a, H5b and H5c (*The more positive attitude people have towards a) immigration, b) cultural liberalism and c) European integration, the more likely it is that they will vote for SDPs*). In model 2, for every unit increase on the scale of positive attitudes towards cultural liberalism, the odds for voting for SDPs increase with 12.9 percent. The positive attitudes towards European integration and immigration policies have a smaller positive effect, but are still statistically significant for the probabilities to vote for SDPs. These three effects can be noticed despite the control variable for the personal attitudes towards welfare policies, which is very significant: for every unit increase on this

variable, the odds for voting for SDPs increase with 32.8 percent. This means that the three cultural issues clearly have an effect on voting for SDPs. In sum, hypotheses H5a, H5b, and H5c can be provisionally adopted.

Regarding the control variables, gender is only significant in model 1, where it has a positive effect on voting for SDPs. Age and education matter in both the models. For every year increase in age, the odds of voting for SDPs increase with 0.4 percent in model 2. Education shows to be negatively related with voting for SDPs, as in model 2 the odds for those people with an intermediate level of education to vote for an SDP are 20.4 percent lower than the odds of people with a low level of education. The odds of people who completed a high level of education are even 34.1 percent lower than the odds of the lowest educated.

4.5.3 Cross-level effects

At this point an insight into the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables concerning the micro-level hypotheses has been provided. The next step will be to analyse the hypotheses that concern a cross-level effect.

There are two hypotheses that deal with a cross-level effect: hypothesis H7 (*In countries where PRRPs are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs*) and hypothesis H9 (*In countries where left-wing populist parties are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs*). Table 4.6 shows both model 3, which includes all of the relevant micro-level independent variables and the variable for measuring the presence of a strong left-wing populist party in the party system, and model 4, which is a similar model but including the variable for measuring the presence of a strong PRRP instead. Due to computation complexity, in model 3 the control variable for age has been omitted.

Table 4.6: Three-level logistic regression analysis of voting for SDPs.

	Model 3		Model 4	
	B	OR	B	OR
Fixed effects				
Intercept	-1.913*** (0.105)	0.148	-2.249*** (0.125)	0.110
Women (ref: men)	-0.002 (0.016)	0.998	-0.001 (0.016)	0.999
Age			0.004*** (0.001)	1.004
Educational level (ref: low)				
Intermediate	-0.273*** (0.021)	0.761	-0.229*** (0.021)	0.795
High	-0.464*** (0.024)	0.629	-0.418*** (0.025)	0.659
Social class (ref.: working class)				
Middle class	-0.239*** (0.022)	0.788	-0.244*** (0.022)	0.783
Top class	-0.296*** (0.022)	0.744	-0.309*** (0.022)	0.734
Outsiders (ref.: insiders)	-0.287*** (0.019)	0.751	-0.257*** (0.020)	0.774
Positive attitudes towards:				
Cultural liberalism	0.109*** (0.009)	1.116	0.121*** (0.009)	1.129
European integration	0.044*** (0.004)	1.045	0.045*** (0.004)	1.046
Immigration policies	0.051*** (0.004)	1.053	0.052*** (0.004)	1.053
Welfare policies	0.287*** (0.008)	1.333	0.283*** (0.008)	1.328
Strong left-wing populist party in country	-0.216 (0.158)	0.805		
Strong PRRP in country			0.135 (.144)	1.145
Random effects				
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.070		0.072	
Country variance (level-3)	0.151		0.164	
ICC (country-years within countries)	0.063		0.067	
-2LL	106146.06		106085.05	
Wald Chi-Square (df)	3192.06 (11)		3250.93 (12)	
Level-2 N	106		106	
Level-3 N	18		18	
Total N	91826		91826	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors are noted in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefficients.

In table 4.6 it is shown that the two macro-level variables for measuring a strong left-wing populist party or PRRP in a country do not have a significant effect on voting

for SDPs. This is in line with the results of the bivariate model, where both variables did not show to have a significant effect on voting for SDPs either. Therefore I cannot find evidence for hypothesis H7 (*In countries where PRRPs are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs*) and hypothesis H9 (*In countries where left-wing populist parties are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs*).

4.5.4 Cross-level interactions

The next step will be to analyse the hypotheses that relate to a cross-level interaction effect. I have started analysing these interactions by putting them in simple models that only include a micro variable, a macro variable and the interaction between these two. Subsequently I added the remaining independent variables on the micro level and the control variables to these models, and lastly I made an attempt to include more than one interaction variable in the models. I will discuss their implications in the paragraphs below.

Table 4.7 below shows the results of the interaction effects in the most simple three-level logistic regression models, only including the two relevant variables and the interaction effect. The full models can be found under heading A.9 in the appendix. It can be seen that the interaction between social class and the party positions on economic liberalization policies is not significant. This result is in contrary to what was expected from hypothesis H2 (*The more SDPs favour economic liberalization policies, the smaller the effect of class voting on voting for SDPs*). Thus, in this simple model the positive party positions of SDPs on economic liberalization policies do not affect the class effect.

Table 4.7: Results of cross-level interactions in simple three-level logistic model

Hypothesis	*Variables*	*B*	*OR*
H2	*Intercept*	-0.562***	0.570
	Middle class	-0.368***	0.692
	Top class	-0.484***	0.616
	Positive party positions on economic liberalization policies	0.097*	1.102
	Interaction	**0.004**	**1.004**
H4	*Intercept*	-0.644***	0.525
	Outsiders	-0.453***	0.636
	Positive party positions on employment protection	-0.030**	0.970
	Interaction	**0.024****	**1.024**
H6a	*Intercept*	-0.901***	0.406
	Positive attitudes on immigration#	0.050***	1.051
	Positive party positions on immigration policies#	0.221	1.247
	Interaction#	**0.026**	**1.027**
H6b	*Intercept*	-0.811***	0.444
	Positive attitudes on cultural liberalism#	0.096***	1.101
	Positive party positions on cultural liberalism#	-0.201**	0.818
	Interaction#	**0.113*****	**1.120**
H6c	*Intercept*	-0.942	0.390
	Positive attitudes on European integration#	0.014	1.015
	Positive party positions on European integration#	0.024	1.024
	Interaction#	**0.011****	**1.011**
H8	*Intercept*	-0.564***	0.569
	Middle class	-0.345***	0.708
	Top class	-0.493***	0.611
	Strong PRRP in country	0.157	1.169
	Interaction	**-0.059**	**0.943**

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. #=calculated in a two-level model (respondents nested in country-years) due to computational problems.

The interaction between the variables for outsiders and the positive party positions on employment protection is significant and has a positive direction. Given the main effects in the model, the interaction term demonstrates that the likelihood of outsiders to vote for SDPs is almost not affected by SDPs becoming more positive towards employment protection. The likelihood that insiders vote for SDPs, on the other

hand, is clearly negatively affected by SDPs becoming more positive towards employment protection. This means that when SDPs become more positive towards employment protection, the differences in the probabilities to vote for SDPs between insiders and outsiders become actually smaller. Therefore this finding does not match hypothesis H4 (*The more SDPs favour employment protection policies, the larger the effect of the insider/outsider division on voting for SDPs*).

The interaction between personal attitudes towards immigration policies and positive party positions on immigration policies is not significant, which means that there is no evidence to proof hypothesis H6a (*The more positive the party position of SDPs on immigration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on immigration issues on the voting probabilities for SDPs*).

The interaction between personal attitudes and the positive party positions towards cultural liberalism is positively significant. Given the main effects, this means that if someone has a positive attitude on cultural liberalism, a more positive party position on cultural liberalism makes it more likely that a person will vote for an SDP. Therefore this finding gives evidence to believe that hypothesis H6b (*The more positive the party position of SDPs on cultural liberalism, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on cultural liberalism on the voting probabilities for SDPs*) is indeed true.

The interaction effect between the individual attitudes towards European integration and the positive party positions towards European integration is a significant one in a positive direction. As a result of this, given the main effects, the positive effect of more positive personal attitudes towards European integration on voting for SDPS will be enhanced by more positive party positions on European integration. This supports what was expected by hypothesis H6c (*The more positive the*

party position of SDPs on European integration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on European integration on the voting probabilities for SDPs).

Regarding the presence of a strong PRRP, no interaction effect can be found. On the basis of this model therefore no proof can be found to support hypothesis H8 (*In countries where PRRPs are strong, the class effect will be smaller*).

The results above apply only to a simply model with two covariates and one interaction term. As mentioned in the introduction of this subsection, the next step will be to include the interaction term in a more elaborate model in which the remaining independent variables and the control variables are included as well. The results of these models can be found in table 4.8 below. Again, table 4.8 only includes the main variables and the interaction effect between these variables. The full models can be found under heading A.10 in the appendix.

In comparison with table 4.7, the results from table 4.8 remain relatively stable. The results of the interaction effects of hypotheses H2, H4, H6a, H6b do not change very much, apart from small changes in the coefficients. Furthermore, the interaction effect of hypothesis H6c becomes slightly less significant, as the $p>0.01$ in table 4.7, but $p>0.05$ in table 9. There is however a major difference between table 4.7 and table 4.8 concerning hypothesis H8. In table 4.7 the interaction term between the variables for the middleclass and a country with a strong PRRP is not significant, but in table 4.8 it is significant in a positive direction($p>0.05$). This means that in the more elaborate model, given the main effects, in a country with a strong PRRP the working class becomes less likely to vote for SDPs. However, this interaction effect is quite small for the working class. For the middle class, it is much stronger. In a country with a strong PRRP, the middle class is significantly less likely to vote for SDPs than in a country without a strong

PRRP. This finding thus suggests the opposite of what was expected from hypothesis H8 (*In countries where PRRPs are strong, the class effect will be smaller*).

Table 4.8: Results of cross-level interactions in a three-level logistic model

Hypothesis	*Variables*	*B*	*OR*
H2	*Intercept*		
	Middle class	-0.310***	0.735
	Top class	-0.465***	0.628
	Positive party positions on economic liberalization policies	0.113*	1.120
	Interaction	**0.000**	**1.000**
H4	*Intercept*	-0.283***	0.754
	Outsiders	-0.362***	0.696
	Positive party positions on employment protection	-0.029*	0.972
	Interaction	**0.028****	**1.028**
H6a	*Intercept*	-0.405***	0.667
	Positive attitudes on immigration	0.057***	1.059
	Positive party positions on immigration policies	0.231	1.259
	Interaction	**0.037**	**1.037**
H6b	*Intercept*	-0.356***	0.700
	Positive attitudes on cultural liberalism	0.105***	1.111
	Positive party positions on cultural liberalism	-0.085	0.912
	Interaction	**0.105*****	**1.110**
H6c	*Intercept*	-0.436***	0.647
	Positive attitudes on European integration	0.027**	1.028
	Positive party positions on European integration	0.021	1.022
	Interaction	**0.010***	**1.010**
H8	*Intercept*	-0.439***	0.645
	Middle class	-0.213***	0.809
	Top class	-0.312***	0.732
	Strong PRRP in country	0.162	1.175
	Interaction	**-0.087***	**0.916**

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001.

The next step regarding the cross-level interaction hypotheses is to test whether the effects of the interactions hold when more than one interaction is included in a single model. Table 4.9 shows the results of two models, model 5 and model 6. In model

5 the interaction between the middle class and the positive party positions on economic liberalization policies (relating to hypothesis H2), and the interaction between outsiders and the positive party positions towards employment protection (relating to hypothesis H4) have been tested together. Model 6 incorporates no less than three interactions: the interaction between the positive attitudes and the positive party positions towards immigration (relating to hypothesis H6a), the interaction between the positive attitudes and positive party positions towards cultural liberalism (relating to hypothesis H6b) and the interaction between the positive attitudes and positive party positions on European integration. Because of computational complexity, both models have been tested with a two-level structure.

In model 5 it can be seen that the interaction variable between the middle class and the positive party positions on economic liberalization policies has no significant effect. This finding is in line with the earlier ones in that no evidence can be found which supports hypothesis H2 (*The more SDPs favour economic liberalization policies, the smaller the effect of class voting on voting for SDPs*). The interaction variable between outsiders and positive party positions on employment protection is again significant, and apart from some small changes in the estimates, this relationship has not changed with respect to the models in which it was analyse earlier in this chapter. It still does not provide the evidence to believe that the expectation of hypothesis H4 (*The more SDPs favour employment protection policies, the larger the effect of the insider/outsider division on voting for SDPs*) can be adopted, as insiders become less likely instead of more likely to vote for SDPs when SDPs take in a more positive party position towards employment protection. Thus, model 5 confirms what was assumed from previous models and does not show any important deviations.

Table 4.9: Three-level logistic regression analysis of voting for SDPs

	Model 5		Model 6	
	B	OR	B	OR
Fixed effects				
Intercept	-0.396*** (0.083)	0.673	-0.402*** (0.080)	0.669
Women (ref: men)	-0.000 (0.016)	0.999	0.003 (0.016)	1.003
Age	0.004*** (0.001)	1.004	0.004*** (0.001)	1.004
Educational level (ref: low)				
Intermediate	-0.227*** (0.022)	0.797	-0.227*** (0.022)	0.797
High	-0.406*** (0.025)	0.666	-0.412*** (0.025)	0.662
Social class (ref.: working class)				
Middle class	-0.248*** (0.027)	0.780	-0.241*** (0.022)	0.786
Top class	-0.307*** (0.022)	0.736	-0.305*** (0.023)	0.737
Outsiders (ref.: insiders)	-0.364*** (0.042)	0.700	-0.260*** (0.020)	0.771
Positive attitudes towards:				
Cultural liberalism	0.129*** (0.009)	1.137	0.110*** (0.016)	1.117
European integration	0.046*** (0.004)	1.047	0.032** (0.010)	1.033
Immigration policies	0.053*** (0.004)	1.054	0.056*** (0.008)	1.058
Welfare policies	0.281*** (0.008)	1.324	0.279*** (0.008)	1.322
Positive party positions towards:				
Economic liberalization policies	0.043 (0.061)	1.044		
Employment protection	-0.010 (0.014)	0.994		
Cultural liberalism			-0.280*** (0.078)	0.756
European integration			0.031 (0.030)	1.032
Immigration policies			0.606*** (0.307)	1.834
Middleclass*Positive party positions towards economic liberalization policies	-0.005 (0.025)	0.995		
Outsiders*Positive party positions towards employment protection	0.029** (0.008)	1.029		
Positive attitudes towards cultural liberalism*Positive party positions towards cultural liberalism			0.087*** (0.023)	1.091
Positive attitudes towards European integration*Positive party positions towards European integration			0.007 (0.004)	1.007
Positive attitudes towards immigration*Positive party positions towards immigration			0.023 (0.045)	1.024

Continuation of table 4.9:

	Model 3	Model 4
Random effects		
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.223	0.212
ICC (country-years)	0.064	0.060
Slope variance (σ^2) of middleclass effect	0.006	
Slope variance (σ^2) of outsider effect	0.033	
Slope variance (σ^2) of cultural liberalism attitudes effect		0.010
Slope variance (σ^2) of European integration attitudes effect		0.002
Slope variance (σ^2) of immigration attitudes effect		0.004
-2LL	101655.46	101373.60
Wald Chi-Square (df)	2996.19 (15)	2915.05 (17)
Level-2 N	102	102
Total N	87985	87985

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors are noted in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefficients.

Model 6 demonstrates the interactions of the three cultural issues between the positive attitudes on the micro-level and the positive party positions on the macro-level. The interaction variable between the positive attitudes and the positive party positions on immigration is not significant, which confirms the earlier findings. Therefore hypothesis H6a (*The more positive the party position of SDPs on immigration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on immigration issues on the voting probabilities for SDPs*) cannot be confirmed yet.

The interaction variable between the positive attitudes and the positive party positions on cultural liberalism is in line with the earlier findings as well. This interaction effect is positively significant and ensures that those who have a positive attitude towards cultural liberalism are more likely to vote for SDPs when these parties become more positive in their party positions about cultural liberalism. Therefore, the findings match the expectation from hypothesis H6b *(The more positive the party*

position of SDPs on cultural liberalism, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on cultural liberalism on the voting probabilities for SDPs).

The next interaction effect of interest in this model is the one between the positive attitudes and positive party positions about European integration. Regarding this relationship, it was expected from H6c (*The more positive the party position of SDPs on European integration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on European integration on the voting probabilities for SDPs*) that the effect of the positive attitudes on voting for SDPs would be enhanced by more positive party positions on European integration. In the previous models this interaction variable was significant but only just ($p>0.05$ in table 4.9). Model 6 shows that this significant effect disappears when analysed in a more complex statistical model, which entails that the significant effect that was found before is not very robust.

Furthermore, both model 5 and 6 demonstrate that all of the micro-level variables hold their effects very firmly, even in a more complex model. Especially social class shows to be very robust. The variable for measuring outsiders and insiders also keeps its effect, but this it is stronger in model 3 than in model 4. Since model 4 is more complex, this can indicate that in a more inclusive model, the effect of the insiders/outsiders is somewhat reduced.

Table 4.10 on the following page shows model 7, which includes interaction effects of the positive attitudes and positive party positions towards cultural liberalism and European integration, as well as the interaction between the middle class and the presence of a strong PRRP. From model 7 it can be seen that the interaction between the positive party positions and individual attitudes on cultural liberalism is once more very significant in a positive direction. Again, this implies that the expected effect hypothesis H6b *(The more positive the party position of SDPs on cultural liberalism, the larger the*

effect of people's attitudes on cultural liberalism on the voting probabilities for SDPs) is indeed found.

Table 4.10: Three-level logistic regression analysis of voting for SDPs

	Model 7	
	B	OR
Fixed effects		
Intercept	-0.392*** (0.089)	0.676
Women (ref: men)	0.001 (0.016)	1.001
Age	0.004*** (0.001)	1.004
Educational level (ref: low)		
Intermediate	-0.227*** (0.022)	0.800
High	-0.407*** (0.026)	0.665
Social class (ref.: working class)		
Middle class	-0.214*** (0.026)	0.807
Top class	-0.308*** (0.023)	0.735
Outsiders (ref.: insiders)	-0.261*** (0.020)	0.770
Positive attitudes towards:		
Cultural liberalism	0.106*** (0.017)	1.111
European integration	0.030** (0.010)	1.030
Immigration policies	0.052*** (0.004)	1.054
Welfare policies	0.280*** (0.008)	1.323
Positive party positions towards:		
Cultural liberalism	-0.204** (0.076)	0.816
European integration	0.040 (0.030)	1.040
Strong PRRP in country	-0.038 (0.099)	0.962
Positive attitudes towards cultural liberalism*Positive party positions towards cultural liberalism	0.101*** (0.024)	1.106
Positive attitudes towards European integration*Positive party positions towards European integration	0.009* (0.004)	1.009
Middle class*Strong PRRP in country	-0.075* (0.035)	0.928
Random effects		
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.216	
ICC (country-years)	0.066	
Slope variance (σ^2) of cultural liberalism attitudes effect	0.013	
Slope variance (σ^2) of European integration attitudes effect	0.006	
-2LL	101493.49	
Wald Chi-Square (df)	2961.54 (17)	
Level-2 N	102	
Total N	87985	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors are noted in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefficients.

In contrast to model 6, the interaction between the positive attitudes and positive party positions towards European integration does show to be significant in model 7. Given the main effects and the direction of the interaction effect, this implies that the positive effect of the positive attitudes towards European integration on voting for SDPs will become larger when SDPs take in a more positive party position on European integration as well. This finding confirms what was expected by hypothesis H6c (*The more positive the party position of SDPs on European integration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on European integration on the voting probabilities for SDPs*).

The last interaction effect in model 7 is the one between the middle class and the presence of a strong PRRP in a country. Similar to the simple interaction effect, in model 7 this interaction effect is significant in a negative direction. Again, given the main effects, when there is a strong PRRP present in a country's party system, the working class will be less likely to vote for SDPs. The middle class however becomes much less likely to vote for SDPs too in a country with a strong PRRP. This finding therefore does not support hypothesis H8 (*In countries where PRRPs are strong, the class effect will be smaller*), as the class effect actually becomes larger and not smaller.

4.5.5 Marginal effects

In chapter 3 (subsection 3.4.2), I have explained that logistic regression models have as a drawback that they are more difficult to interpret than linear models. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that interpreting the log odds or odds as actual effects can be risky, since these estimates can be influenced by the variables that have not been included in the respective model. Yet, a possible solution is to calculate the marginal effects that show how the probabilities that P(Y=1) will change when the estimates of independent variable X change as well, given a set value of the other independent variables.

Therefore, in this subsection I will show the results of the marginal effects of the variables that have shown a significant effect before.

Table 4.11 shows the marginal effects at the predicted means that have been calculated for the micro-level relationships[11]. Concerning hypothesis H1 (Citizens belonging to the working class are more likely to vote for SDPs than citizens that belong to the middle class) it has been shown in the previous subsections that working class citizens are indeed more likely to vote for SDPs than middle class citizens. After calculating the marginal effects, we can confirm this finding. It can be seen from table 4.11 that the probabilities of the middle class to vote for SDPs are 4.8 percent higher than the probabilities of the working class.

The expectation of hypothesis H3 (*Insiders are more likely than outsiders to vote for SDPs*) is that insiders will be more likely to vote for SDPs than outsiders, and I have shown that the results support this claim. Again, table 4.11 confirms this finding. Outsiders are exactly 5 percent less likely to vote for SDPs than insiders.

Table 4.11: Marginal effects of micro-level effects

Variables	Contrast	Std. Err.
Middle class (ref: working class)	-0.048	0.005
Outsiders (ref: insiders)	-0.050	0.004

Calculating the marginal effects for the variables that relate to the hypotheses H5a, H5b and H5c (*The more positive attitude people have towards a) immigration, b) cultural liberalism and c) European integration, the more likely it is that they will vote for SDPs*) is slightly more complex because these attitudes concern continuous independent variables. However, an important advantage of a continuous variable is that this makes

[11] The marginal effects of table 4.11 are based on the multilevel logistic regression model 2 which can be found in table 6.

it possible to plot the marginal effects in a graph. As images often speak louder than words, the figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 below display the marginal effects of the relationship between the positive attitudes towards the three cultural issues and voting for SDPs[12]. In these figures, the marginal effects are shown as predicted means. This implies that they show the average score of Y (voting for SDPs) when everyone in the sample would score the same value on X.



Figure 2.2: Marginal effects of the positive attitudes towards immigration

[12] The marginal effects of figure 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 are based on the multilevel logistic regression model 2 which can be found in table 4.5.



Figure 4.3: Marginal effects of the positive attitudes towards cultural liberalism



Figure 4.4: Marginal effects of the positive attitudes towards European integration

These three figures clearly show that the positive individual attitudes towards immigration, cultural liberalism and European all have a positive effect on voting for SDPs. For example, figure 4.2 shows that the predicted probability of voting for SDPs would be higher than 0.35 if everyone in the sample has the maximum score of 10 on the positive attitudes towards immigration, while the predicted probability would be around 0.25 if everyone in the sample has the minimum score of 0 on the positive attitudes towards immigration.

The following step will be to show the results of the marginal effects for the cross-level interaction variables[13]. The first figure that will be shown here is figure 4.5, which relates to hypothesis H4 (*The more SDPs favour employment protection policies, the smaller the effect of the insider/outsider division on voting for SDPs*).



Figure 4.5: Marginal effects of the cross-level interaction of the party positions towards employment protection on the relationship between the insiders/outsiders and voting for SDPs

[13] The interaction effects that are demonstrated in figure 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 are based on the effects that have been demonstrated in table 4.8 before.

Figure 4.5 shows that insiders are more likely to vote for SDPs than outsiders. However, as SDPs become more positive in their party positions on employment protection, the probabilities that both the insiders and outsiders will vote for SDPs is strongly reduced.

Furthermore, figure 4.6 below shows the marginal effects of the cross-level interaction of the positive party positions towards cultural liberalism on the relationship between the positive individual attitudes towards cultural liberalism and voting for SDPs.



Figure 4.6: Marginal effects of the cross-level interaction of the party positions towards cultural liberalism on the relationship between the positive attitudes on cultural liberalism and voting for SDPs. PP: Party position.

From figure 4.6 it can be seen that the more positive SDPs become towards cultural liberalism, the steeper the slope of the effect of the individual attitudes towards cultural liberalism on voting for SDPs. It can be seen that when a person has a negative attitude towards cultural liberalism, a more positive party position on the issue will significantly

reduce that person's likelihood to vote for SDPs. In contrast, when a person has a more positive attitude towards cultural liberalism, a more positive party position enhances the effect of the individual attitudes on voting for SDPs. Therefore the expectation of hypothesis H6b *(The more positive the party position of SDPs on cultural liberalism, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on cultural liberalism on the voting probabilities for SDPs*) can be confirmed.



Figure 4.7: Marginal effects of the cross-level interaction of the party positions towards European integration on the relationship between the positive attitudes on European integration and voting for SDPs. PP: Party position.

Figure 4.7 displays the marginal effects that relate to hypothesis H6c (*The more positive the party position of SDPs on European integration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on European integration on the voting probabilities for SDPs*). It can be seen that the expectation of this hypothesis is supported by the data. For a person with a more positive attitude towards European integration, a more positive party position indeed significantly increases the likelihood to vote for SDPs.

The last figure that is included in this section is figure 4.8. This figure shows the cross-level interaction effect of the presence of a strong PRRP on the effect of social class on voting for SDPs.



Figure 4.8: Marginal effects of the class level interaction of the presence of a strong PRRP on the effect of social class on voting for SDPs

The effect that was found in the interaction models regarding hypothesis H7 (*In countries where PRRPs are strong, the class effect will be smaller*) was quite complex. I have tried to explain the effect as well as possible, but nothing beats the information that figure 4.8 provides. It shows in a simple way that in a country with a strong PRRP, the working class becomes indeed less likely to vote for SDPs. However, the middle class also becomes less likely to vote for SDPs in that situation. Since this effect is much stronger for the middle class than for the working class, it can be concluded that the class effect becomes actually larger in a country where a strong PRRP is present.

4.5.6 Robustness of the effects

The next analytical step will be to test whether the effects that are found are robust or not. In this section I will check the robustness of those variables that could have been operationalized a bit different. The first variable that will be checked is *positive attitudes towards European integration*. It has been explained in the operationalization that this variable is measured by a proxy variable in the ESS, 'people's trust in the European parliament'. This has been done because a more direct indicator in the ESS, 'European unification should go further or has already gone too far', was not included in two of the seven ESS rounds. However, the correlation between both variables was not as high as I hoped for (0.353, significant at 0.01 level). Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to check whether the alternative variable, 'European unification go further or gone too far', will produce different results. This alternative variable has a minimum of '0' (gone too far) and a maximum of '10' (should go further). Both variables are therefore measured on a scale from '0' to '10'.

Table 4.12 shows the results of a bivariate analysis of both variables on voting for SDPs. As can be seen, the alternative variable (V2) is significant in a positive direction as well. Moreover, they do not differ much concerning the strength of the effect either.

Table 4.12: Three-level bivariate logistic regression analysis of voting for SDPs

	Model 2		Model 8	
	B	OR	B	OR
Intercept	-1.035*** (0.101)	0.355	-1.081*** (0.104)	0.339
V1: People's trust in the European parliament	0.035*** (0.003)	1.035		
V2: European unification should go further or has already gone too far			0.038*** (0.000)	1.039
Total N	120515		88568	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors are noted in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefficients.

Table 4.13 shows two models in which all of the other relevant micro variables have been included. Model 2 is the same model as displayed in table 4.5, model 8 is a similar model but then with the alternative variable V2. The results of the full models can be found under heading A.11 in the appendix. It shows that in a more comprehensive statistical model, both V1 and V2 continue to have a significant, positive effect of a similar strength. However, model 8 has a total N of approximately 70 000, which means that more than 20 000 respondents are lost compared to model 2.

Table 4.13: Results of three-level micro-level logistic regression model

Variables	*B*	*OR*
Model 2:		
Intercept	-2.199***	0.111
V1: People's trust in the European parliament	0.045***	1.046
Total N: 91826		
Model 6:		
Intercept	-2.145***	0.117
V2: European unification should go further or has already gone too far	0.037***	1.038
Total N: 67979		

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001.

The last step concerning the attitudes towards European integration is to analyse how and if the cross-level interaction between the personal attitudes and the party positions towards European integration change when not V1, but V2 is included in the model. Table 4.14 shows a short summary of two different models. The first interaction concerns the same model that has been used in the cross-level interaction effect of hypothesis H6c in table 4.8, while the second interaction is similar but includes V2 instead of V1. The results of the full model including V2 can be found under heading A.12 in the appendix.

It can be seen that the model with V2, the interaction variable gets more significant, but does not change a lot concerning its strength. What does nevertheless change is the direction of the direct effect of the party positions on European integration. Instead of being a positive one, it has changed to a negative effect now. However, in sum, given the main effects, the fact remains that the positive effect of individual attitudes towards European integration on voting for SDPs is enhanced by a positive party position of SDPs on European integration.

Table 4.14: Results of cross-level interactions in a three-level logistic model

Hypothesis	*Variables*	*B*	*OR*
H6c	Intercept	-0.436***	0.647
	V1: People's trust in the European parliament	0.027**	1.028
	Positive party positions on European integration	0.021	1.022
	Interaction	**0.010***	**1.010**
	Total N: 87985		
H6c	Intercept	-0.579***	0.561
	V2: European unification should go further or has already gone too far	0.012	1.012
	Positive party positions on European integration	-0.024	0.976
	Interaction	**0.017*** **	**1.017**
	Total N: 64028		

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001.

Thus, although the interaction effect has a higher effect and is more significant when using the alternative variable, the direction of the interaction effect remains stable and does not change. Consequently I can conclude that the effect of variable V1 is fairly robust.

The second micro-level variable that I will check here is *people's positive opinions about immigration*. To measure these attitudes, I have used the ESS' indicator 'Immigrants make country a worse or better place to live', which scores from '0' (worse

place to live) to '10' (better place to live). I will refer to this variable as V1. Next to this variable, there was another variable that I could have included: 'Country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants', which scores from '0' (undermined) to '10' (enriched) as well. To this alternative variable I will refer as V2.

Table 4.15 compares the three-level bivariate regression results of both the variable that has been used throughout this chapter, V1, and the alternative variable V2. It shows that both variables are significant in a positive direction and have a similar strength.

Table 4.15: Three-level bivariate logistic regression analysis of voting for SDPs.

	B	OR	B	OR
Intercept	-1.090***	0.336	-1.145***	0.318
V1: Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	0.042***	1.042		
V2: Country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants			0.046***	1.047
Total N	128030		127754	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001.

Table 4.16 on the following page demonstrates the effect of both V1 and V2 in two models that includes more independent and control variables on the micro-level. Model 2 is the same model as displayed in table 4.5, model 9 is a similar one but then with the alternative variable V2. The full models can be found under heading A.13 in the appendix. Again, it is shown that V1 and V2 are very similar and have the same effects.

Table 4.16: Results of three-level micro-level logistic regression model

Variables	*B*	*OR*
Model 2:		
Intercept	-2.199***	0.111
V1: Immigrants make country better place to live	0.052***	1.053
Total N: 91826		
Model 9:		
Intercept	-2.235***	0.107
V2: Country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants	0.060***	1.062
Total N: 91964		

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001.

Furthermore, in table 4.17 I have compared the cross-level interaction effects concerning hypothesis H6a (*The more positive the party position of SDPs on immigration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on immigration issues on the voting probabilities for SDPs*) between the original model as used in table 4.8 before with V1, and a model with the alternative variable V2. Once more, the V2-model does not show any important differences, as the interaction coefficient continues to be insignificant.

Therefore, I can conclude that the results concerning the variable *people's positive opinions about immigration* stay very robust, even when using an alternative variable.

Table 4.17: Results of cross-level interactions in a three-level logistic model

Hypothesis	*Variables*	*B*	*OR*
H6a	*Intercept*	-0.405***	0.667
	V1: Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	0.057***	1.059
	Positive party positions on immigration policies	0.231	1.259
	Interaction	**0.037**	**1.037**
H6a	*Intercept*[#]	-2.294***	0.101
	V2: Country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants[#]	0.063***	1.065
	Positive party positions on immigration policies[#]	0.180	1.197
	Interaction[#]	**0.026**	**1.026**

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. [#]=calculated in a two-level model (respondents nested in country-years) due to computational problems.

4.6 Discussion

With the help of several multilevel logistic regression models, I have analysed the degree to which class voting is still relevant for voting for SDPs. All of the analysed micro-models suggest that class voting continues to have an effect. Working class people, the blue-collar workers, vote more often for SDPs than the middle class, the white-collar workers. When more independent variables are included in the analysis, either micro-level or macro-level, this effect pursues to exist. Therefore, considering the data it is safe to claim that hypothesis H1 can be adopted. Blue-collar workers continue to be significantly more likely to vote for SDPs than white-collar workers. For determining who will vote for SDPs, class politics is thus still a major contributing factor.

Furthermore, from the class politics theory it was predicted that the party positions of SDPs on economic liberalization policies would have a serious effect on class voting. It was expected that when SDPs adopt a positive party position on economic liberalization policies, the working class would be less likely to vote for SDPs. However, I have found no empirical proof of this interaction effect, since in none of the models a significant effect on voting for SDPs was noticed. Consequently I will reject hypothesis H2 (*The more SDPs favour economic liberalization policies, the smaller the effect of class voting on voting for SDPs*).

The insider-outsider theory expects that insiders are more likely to vote for SDPs than outsiders. The various models that I have analysed all confirm this expectation and thus the effect shows to be robust. Therefore, hypothesis H3 (*Insiders are more likely than outsiders to vote for SDPs*) can be adopted. I also expected from the insider-outsider theory that more positive party positions of SDPs on employment protection would enhance the relationship between insiders and voting for SDPs. In my models, this effect however cannot be observed. Surprisingly, when SDPs become more positive towards

employment protection, insiders are less likely to vote for SDPs, while the behaviour of outsiders does not change so much. Thus, hypothesis H4 (*The more SDPs favour employment protection policies, the larger the effect of the insider/outsider division on voting for SDPs*) is rejected.

The integration-demarcation theory supposes that cultural issues, especially immigration, cultural liberalism and European integration, have become more and more relevant for studying voting behaviour over the last years. My empirical results can confirm that claim. The individual attitudes towards immigration, cultural liberalism and European integration all have significant positive effects on voting for SDPs. This means that the more positive people are about any of these three issues, the higher the likelihood that they will vote for SDPs. As a result, hypothesis H5 (*The more positive attitude people have towards a) immigration, b) cultural liberalism and c) European integration, the more likely it is that they will vote for SDPs*) can be adopted.

Following from the integration-demarcation theory, I also expected that the party positions on cultural issues would interact with the effects of the individual attitudes towards cultural issues on voting for SDPs. The data showed that two of the three interaction effects concerning the cultural issues had a significant effect. First, the positive party positions on immigration policy did not have a direct effect on voting for SDPs, neither did the interaction between individual attitudes and party positions on the issue. Therefore, hypothesis H6a (*The more positive the party position of SDPs on immigration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on immigration issues on the voting probabilities for SDPs*) can be rejected.

In contrast, the interaction variable between the positive party positions on cultural liberalism and the individual attitudes on cultural liberalism was highly significant with a positive direction. This implies that people that are more positive

about cultural liberalism will be more probable to vote for SDPs when these parties take in a more positive position towards cultural liberalism. Therefore, hypothesis H6b *(The more positive the party position of SDPs on cultural liberalism, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on cultural liberalism on the voting probabilities for SDPs*) can be adopted.

The interaction effect of the positive party positions and the individual attitudes on European integration was positively related with voting for SDPs as well. This implies that when SDPs take in a more positive party position towards European integration, the positive effect between personal attitudes on European integration and voting for SDPs will be enhanced. Thus, hypothesis H6c (*The more positive the party position of SDPs on European integration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on European integration on the voting probabilities for SDPs*) can be adopted too.

Closely related to the integration-demarcation theory is the theory about populism. Regarding SDPs, it was expected from this theory that the presence of a strong PRRP in the party system diminishes the likelihood that people will vote for SDPs. Nevertheless, a direct effect of the presence of a strong PRRP on voting for SDPs was not found in the data. Thus, hypothesis H7 (*In countries where PRRPs are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs*) can be rejected.

It was also expected that the presence of a strong PRRP would interact with the class effect as it was tested in hypothesis H1 (*Citizens belonging to the working class are more likely to vote for SDPs than citizens that belong to the middle class*). I expected that in this case the class effect will become smaller as working class citizens will increasingly vote for PRRPs. My data however did not confirm this expectation. The interaction variable was significant, but given the direction of the effects it means that when a strong PRRP is present, the working-class is less likely to vote for SDPs, but so

does the middle class. Thus, hypothesis H8 which expected that in countries where PRRPs are strong, working class citizens are less likely to vote for SDPs in comparison with the middle class, can be rejected.

Hypothesis H9 (*In countries where left-wing populist parties are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs*) concerned the relationship between left-wing populist parties and voting for SDPs. All of the models that included the variable for the presence of a strong left-wing populist party in a country show no direct effect on voting for SDPs. Consequently, hypothesis H9 can be rejected.

Table 4.18: Overview and assessment of the hypotheses

Theory	*Level*	*Expectation / Hypothesis*	*Assessment*
Class Politics	Micro	H1: Citizens belonging to the working class are more likely to vote for SDPs than citizens that belong to the middle class.	Adopted
	Cross-level interaction	H2: The more SDPs favour economic liberalization policies, the smaller the effect of class voting on voting for SDPs.	Rejected
Insider-outsider Politics	Micro	H3: Insiders are more likely than outsiders to vote for SDPs.	Adopted
	Cross-level interaction	H4: The more SDPs favour employment protection policies, the larger the effect of the insider/outsider division on voting for SDPs.	Rejected
Integration-demarcation Cleavage	Micro	H5: The more positive attitude people have towards a) immigration, b) cultural liberalism and c) European integration, the more likely it is that they will vote for SDPs.	All adopted
	Cross-level interaction	H6: The more positive the party position of SDPs on a) immigration, b) cultural liberalism and c) European integration, the larger the effect of people's attitudes on these issues on the voting probabilities for SDPs.	H6a: rejected. H6b & H6bc: adopted
	Cross-level effect	H7: In countries where PRRPs are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs.	Rejected
	Cross-level interaction	H8: In countries where PRRPs are strong, the class effect will be smaller.	Rejected
	Cross-level effect	H9: In countries where left-wing populist parties are strong, people will be less likely to vote for SDPs.	Rejected

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Research Question

The research question of this thesis consists of two parts, a foregoing descriptive question and the main explanatory question. The descriptive question asked the following:

How did the electoral support for SDPs in Western Europe develop over the period 2002-2014?

With the help of the ESS, I have showed that the mean electoral support for SDPs in Western Europe over the period 2002-2014 has strongly declined. Especially after 2008, the year of the global financial crisis, a sharp decrease in the vote share of SDPs all over Western Europe can be noticed. As a consequence, SDPs have not been doing particularly well over the last years.

The difficult situation for SDPs has been the reason for considering the factors that could be behind the downturn in their electoral support. Therefore, I decided to do research to the groups in society that are the most likely to vote for SDPs and people's motivations to do so. With the help of three main theories, the class politics theory, the insider-outsider theory and the integration-demarcation cleavage theory, with this thesis I have furthered our understanding of social democratic voters and their motivations. In order to do so, I formulated the following main explanatory research question:

To what extent can class politics theory, the insider-outsider theory and the integration-demarcation cleavage theory explain whether people will vote or not for SDPs in Western Europe over the period 2002-2014?

In this thesis, I have found that class politics is still very relevant for voting behaviour and voting for SDPs in particular. As expected from the theory, the working class, the 'blue-collar workers', are more likely than the middle class or the top class to vote for SDPs. Therefore we cannot say 'good bye' to class politics yet. Nevertheless, I could not find any empirical support for the 'social democratic dilemma'. The working class does not appear to punish SDPs for taking in a more positive position on economic liberalization policies.

The insider-outsider distinction shows a strong effect independent of class politics that is very robust. The insiders on the labour market are much more likely to vote for SDPs than the outsiders. Surprisingly, the effect is not enhanced when SDPs take in a more positive party position on employment protection. In that situation, both groups become less likely to vote for SDPs. This is very curious, since the argument of the insider-outsider theory is based on the assumption that insiders more often vote for SDPs *because* of their preferences on employment protection.

The integration-demarcation cleavage theory argues that people are increasingly determining their party choice on the basis of cultural issues, although welfare policy issues remain the most influential ones for determining party choice. My results fully support this claim. Cultural liberalism issues, European integration issues and immigration issues all have an influence on voting for SDPs. Of the macro-level interaction hypotheses only the positive party positions on immigration issues did not show to influence the effect of individual attitudes towards immigration on voting for

SDPs. The party positions on cultural liberalism and European integration both had a positive interaction effect on the relationship between the personal attitudes on these two issues and voting for SDPs. This is a significant result, since these two interactions effects are the only ones that show the expected effects.

As a result of the increasing relevancy of cultural issues, it has been argued that populist parties have increasingly been able to attract voters that would have otherwise voted for SDPs. My results only partly confirm this expectation. I could find no evidence to support the claim that the presence of a strong PRRP or left-wing populist party lowers people's likelihood to vote for PRRPs. Neither did the presence of a strong PRRP make the class effect smaller. On the contrary, because especially the middle class is less likely to vote for SDPs when there is a strong PRRP, the class effect becomes even larger.

Thus, as an answer on main explanatory research question, it can be concluded that all three theories can partly explain why people vote for SDPs. The influence of social class and the insider-outsider division on voting for SDPs is incontrovertible, but the same can be said for the three cultural issues.

5.2 Implications for SDPs

In the following paragraphs I will discuss the implications of my findings for SDPs and their current situation.

The fact that blue-collar workers are still more likely to vote for an SDP than white-collar workers can be interpreted as disadvantageous for SDPs, since the size of the first group has been strongly in decline over the last years. It is ubiquitous knowledge that globalization has led to a translocation of certain parts of enterprises' production process from Western Europe to low-wage countries elsewhere. As a result of this, the amount of traditional industry jobs has been reduced significantly and

society has changed. The traditional blue-collar worker who once had an unswerving loyalty to SDPs has become rare in Western Europe of the 21th century. The fact that class politics is in decline is thus not beneficial for a party family that still greatly relies on the electoral support of the working class.

Moreover it is also shown in this thesis that in recent years, the degree in which SDPs have moved to a more neoliberal position on economic issues has not led to a change in the effect of social class. Thus, SDPs seem unable to appeal to the middle class even if they become more lenient on those policies that to a great extent have determined their right to exist, namely protecting citizens against the adverse effects of the free market.

Regarding the influence of people's position on the labour market, the situation does not get a lot better for SDPs. It is clear that insiders vote more often for SDPs than outsiders. At the same time, the labour market is getting increasingly flexible. Over the last years it has become easier for employers to fire their employees, the amount of part-time jobs has risen and it has become more difficult to acquire a permanent contract. Therefore it can be expected that in the years to come, the group of insiders compared to outsiders will become smaller. Nevertheless, it must be noted that up to now, the size of both groups has remained fairly stable.

Yet, social class and one's position on the labour market are both based on economic issues. A potential reason why SDPs are unable to win voters in these arenas comes from the integration-demarcation cleavage theory, which states that party competition on economic issues is generally in decline. It is argued by this theory that modern politics is more and more about cultural issues. My findings confirm this claim. Concerning the situation of SDPs, I have shown that people who are more positive about cultural issues in general vote more often for SDPs. Although it is hard to predict what

these findings exactly mean for the future of SDPs, it may be very clear that the situation is complicated.

Over the last years the growth in the influx of refugees in Western Europe has been an important political issue that has been extensively covered by the press. In many countries citizens have been of very different opinions about what to do with these refugees. This has produced a delicate situation for SDPs: although since the Third Way these parties have been the protagonists of multiculturalism, taking in a very pronounced position in favour of including more immigrants in society may be an electorally very costly strategy. In this light, it is surprising that I did not find an effect of positive party positions of SDPs on immigration issues. Apparently, becoming more positive about immigration does not give SDPs more votes, but not less either.

Moreover, the process of European integration has not been an issue without discussion either. At the time, a considerable amount of citizens in Western Europe feels alienated by the EU. The negative outcome of the recent 'Brexit'-referendum in the United Kingdom is a clear example of growing Euroscepticism. Therefore, the fact that SDPs are mostly supported by citizens who are positive about European integration could be disadvantageous if the Euroscepticism will continue to grow.

The last cultural issue that has been investigated in this thesis is cultural liberalism. I showed that citizens who are more positive towards cultural liberalism are much more likely to vote for SDPs, an effect that will be enhanced when SDPs take in a very positive position on cultural liberalism.

For SDPs, at this point it would be very relevant to know which electoral strategy will give them the largest amount of electoral support. There is nevertheless not a straight-forward answer on this question. In my opinion, becoming more neoliberal on economic issues is not an good alternative, certainly because I have shown that people's

attitudes towards welfare policies are still very important for their decision to vote for SDPs. It is however obvious that it would not be intelligent for SDPs to underestimate the importance of cultural issues, although this does ask for a prudent approach. Becoming more positive towards cultural liberalism or European integration can provide them with more votes of those people who are very positive about these cultural issues, but taking in more pronounced positive party positions may also lead to losing the support of those people who are less positive about cultural issues. Therefore, the social democratic 'dilemma' might not be an economic dilemma, but a cultural one.

5.3 Research limitations

In this thesis I analysed three independent theories in a combined theoretical approach. I showed how each theory can essentially be traced back to a rational choice perspective and how they differ in their expectations regarding voting for SDPs. An advantage of this approach is that I was able to show how the theories complemented each other where the expectations of one theory seemed to fail. A disadvantage is that because I had to deal with three theories at the same time, I may have paid too little attention in the analysis of each theory's expectations. This is especially the case for the integration-demarcation cleavage theory and its link with populism.

Concerning populism, there was another important limitation. The classification of PRRPs is always open for discussion, but there is a reasonable level of consensus among scholars. The classification of left-wing populists is however more problematic. Moreover, there were only four countries of the eighteen that had a left-wing populist party in the party system during the researched period. This might have influenced the fact that I did not find an effect.

Another limitation is the fact that regarding the insider-outsider theory, I could not investigate the distinction between employment protection and labour market policies because the data was not appropriate for this. From the theoretical framework it could seem that the insider-outsider theory is purely based on preferences about employment protection, something which is not totally true. I could however not measure attitudes or party positions towards labour market policies with the available data, which seriously limited me in the extent to which I could investigate the insider-outsider theory.

The research method that I used was multilevel regression analysis. This approach enabled me to get more accurate results by controlling for the fact that respondents are nested in their respective countries and the years in which they participated in the survey. A drawback of this method however was the complexity and the long time it took for the more extensive models with interaction variables to be computed. As a result it was almost impossible to do a double check on the more complex models or check whether the models were robust when replacing or omitting certain variables.

Furthermore, a drawback of the data I used is that the ESS has little or almost no variables for measuring personal attitudes towards economic issues. Apart from attitudes towards welfare policies the ESS has no other relevant indicators. Therefore I could not control for other economic issues that might have been relevant. Regarding the data, another note is that many of the macro-level indicators derived from the MP are directed only in a positive or negative way. As a consequence I could only analyse one-directional movements of SDPs on the party positions.

5.4 Implications for further research

I believe that there is still much to be gained from further research regarding the link between populist parties and SDPs. This implicates too that more research is needed about populist left-wing parties and their influence on other left-wing parties such as SDPs. Additionally, I suggest that further research must go deeper into the specific cultural issues that have an influence on voting behaviour. I have confirmed the claim that cultural issues are very important for people to determine their party choice and therefore analysing only three categories might be not exhaustive enough.

Lastly, it has been noticed that although the micro-level variables of interest all showed significant effects on voting for SDPs, the macro-level interaction variables regarding the economic preferences proved to be less powerful. Yet, two of the three macro-level interaction variables concerning the cultural preferences did show their expected effects. Further research could therefore elaborate on the effects of party position change regarding the cultural issues in particular.

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Appendix

A.1 Social Democratic Parties per country (2002-2014)

Country	SDP
Austria	Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ)
Belgium	Socialist Party (PS), Socialist Party Different (SP.A.)
Denmark	Social Democratic Party (SD)
Finland	Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP)
France	Socialist Party (PS)
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)
Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)
Iceland	Social Democratic Alliance (SDA)
Ireland	Labour Party (Lab)
Italy	Democrats of the Left (DS), Democratic Party (PD)
Luxembourg	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party (LSAP)
Netherlands	Labour Party (PvdA)
Norway	Norwegian Labour Party (A)
Portugal	Socialist Party (PS)
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)
Sweden	Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP)
Switzerland	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SP)
United Kingdom	Labour Party (Lab)

Sources: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2016), Manifesto Project (2015)

A.2 Populist Radical Right Parties per country (2002-2014)

Country	PRRP
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)
Belgium	Flemish Block, National Front (FN), List Dedecker (LDD)
Denmark	Progress Party (PP), Danish People's Party (DF)
Finland	N/A
France	National Front (FN)
Germany	Republicans (REP)
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)
Iceland	Progressive Party (FSF)
Ireland	N/A
Italy	Northern League (LN)
Luxembourg	N/A
Netherlands	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), Party for Freedom (PVV)
Norway	Progress Party (FrP)
Portugal	National Renovator Party (PNR)
Spain	National Front (FN)
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP)
United Kingdom	National Front (NF)

Sources: All countries except for Iceland (Swank, 2013), Iceland (Ravik Jupskås, 2016).

A.3 Strength of Populist Radical Right Parties (2002-2014)

	Years						
Country	*2002*	*2004*	*2006*	*2008*	*2010*	*2012*	*2014*
Austria	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Belgium	W	S	S	S	S	S	W
Denmark	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Finland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Germany	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
Greece	W	W	W	W	W	S	S
Iceland	W	W	W	W	S	S	S
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	W	S	S	S	S	S	S
Norway	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Portugal	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
Spain	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
Sweden	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
Switzerland	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
United Kingdom	W	W	W	W	W	W	W

W = Weak. S = Strong. - = No PRRP present in that year. *Source:* ECPR Political Data Yearbook (2016).

A.4 Populist Left-Wing Parties per country (2002-2014)

Country	Left-Wing Populist Party
Austria	N/A
Belgium	N/A
Denmark	N/A
Finland	N/A
France	N/A
Germany	German Left Party (Die Linke)
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza)
Iceland	N/A
Ireland	N/A
Italy	Five Star Movement (M5S)
Luxembourg	N/A
Netherlands	Socialist Party (SP)
Norway	N/A
Portugal	N/A
Spain	N/A
Sweden	N/A
Switzerland	N/A
United Kingdom	N/A

Sources: Netherlands (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015), Germany (Hough and Koß, 2009), Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014), Italy (Lanzone and Woods, 2015).

A.5 Strength of Populist Left-Wing Parties (2002-2014)

	Years						
Country	*2002*	*2004*	*2006*	*2008*	*2010*	*2012*	*2014*
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	-	W	W	S	S	S
Greece	-	-	-	W	W	S	S
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	W
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	W	S	S	S	S	S	S
Norway	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Portugal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

W = Weak. S = Strong. - = No left-wing populist party present in that year. *Source:* ECPR Political Data Yearbook (2016).

A.6 Official data: mean electoral support for SDPs in 18 Western European countries (2002-2014)

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Austria	36.5	36.5	35.3	29.3	29.3	29.3	27.1
Belgium	19.7	27.9	27.9	21.2	22.9	22.9	20.5
Denmark	29.1	29.1	25.8	25.5	25.5	24.8	24.8
Finland	22.9	24.5	24.5	21.4	21.4	19.1	19.1
France	25.3	25.3	25.3	24.7	24.7	29.3	29.3
Germany	38.5	38.5	34.3	34.3	23.0	23.0	25.7
Greece	43.8	40.6	40.6	38.1	43.9	12.8	12.8
Iceland	26.8	31.0	31.0	26.8	29.8	29.8	12.9
Ireland	10.8	10.8	10.8	10.1	10.1	19.4	19.4
Italy	16.6	16.6	30.4	33.1	33.1	33.1	25.5
Luxembourg	22.2	23.4	23.4	23.4	21.6	21.6	19.2
Netherlands	15.1	27.2	21.2	21.2	19.6	24.8	24.8
Norway	24.3	24.3	32.7	32.7	35.4	35.4	30.8
Portugal	37.8	37.8	46.4	46.4	37.7	29.2	29.2
Spain	34.2	42.6	42.6	43.9	43.9	28.7	28.7
Sweden	39.9	39.9	35.0	35.0	30.7	30.7	31.0
Switzerland	22.5	23.3	23.3	19.5	19.5	18.7	18.7
UK	40.7	40.7	35.2	35.2	29.0	29.0	29.0

Source: Political Data Yearbook (2016).

A.7 Multicollinearity statistics of the independent variables

Independent variables	VIF	Tolerance
Higher educated (ref: lower educated)	2.39	0.418880
Top class (ref: lower class)	2.24	0.446377
Intermediate educated (ref: lower educated)	1.91	0.524500
Middle class (ref: lower class)	1.84	0.542764
Positive party positions towards cultural liberalism	1.61	0.619440
Strong left-wing populist party in country	1.42	0.702141
Positive party positions towards employment protection	1.40	0.712667
Positive party positions towards immigration policies	1.37	0.729666
Positive party positions towards economic liberalization policies	1.33	0.749344
Positive party positions towards European integration	1.25	0.799359
Strong PRRP in country	1.25	0.802634
Positive individual attitudes towards immigration policies	1.20	0.832402
Age	1.18	0.847416
Positive individual attitudes towards cultural liberalism	1.14	0.873849
Positive individual attitudes towards European integration	1.09	0.918128
Insiders (ref: outsiders)	1.09	0.919230
Positive individual attitudes towards welfare policies	1.08	0.926191
Women (ref: men)	1.07	0.930687

A.8 Icelandic 'Progressive Party'

My e-mail:

From: Willem Gielen
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2016 2:27 PM
To: Anders Ravik Jupskås
Subject: Icelandic Progressive Party: Populist or not?

Dear Dr Jupskås,

My name is Willem Gielen, a master student political science at the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. I am currently working on my final thesis. The reason I email you is that I have a question about a potential populist party. I was advised to email you by a teacher of our political science department, Dr. Andrej Zaslove. You have done research to right-wing populism and have an extensive knowledge of Nordic politics.

Currently, I am doing research to social democratic parties in Western Europe and their constituency. I want to know why people decide to vote, but also not to vote for these parties. A reason that might explain why social democratic parties have seen their vote share declining in recent years is the rise of populist parties.

It could be argued that the working class, the traditional base of support for social democratic parties, is getting alienated from social democratic parties because these parties do not satisfy their preferences on cultural issues (such as immigration policies and European integration). To see if this theoretical expectation holds when tested with empirical evidence, at the moment I am classifying political parties in either a left-wing populist category, a right-wing populist category and a non-populist category.

However, I am not really sure about one case, which is the Icelandic right-wing Progressive Party (PP). According to the Icelandic scholar Bergmann (http://skemman.is/en/stream/get/1946/22353/51635/1/a.2015.11.1.3.pdf), the PP directed itself in a populist direction rapidly after the financial crisis of 2008. Bergmann argues that the PP has clearly shown populist elements in this period. However, he also states that the PP is probably more nationalist than populist, and that in comparison with other right-wing populist parties in Europe, the PP is a soft version of a populist party. `

As a result, from this source I am inclined to classify the PP as a right-wing populist party. However, I also not completely sure since my own knowledge about Icelandic politics is just too limited. Therefore I am asking you, as an expert, this question as well: Would you classify the PP as a right-wing populist party, or are you of the opinion that the PP, although showing certain elements of populism, would not classify as a right-wing populist party?

Thanking you in advance for your help,

Willem Gielen
Master student Political Science and Public Administration
Radboud University Nijmegen
willem.gielen@student.ru.nl

The response:

From: Anders Ravik Jupskås
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2016 2:27 PM

To: Willem Gielen
Subject: Icelandic Progressive Party: Populist or not?

Dear Willem Gielen,

I am afraid I cannot be of much help. Since I don't read Icelandic, the only piece I know of is the one you're quoting. (We need more studies of the unusual suspects!). However, I think I would classify the PP as a right-wing populist party. In many ways it's trajectory seems similar to that of the Swiss People's Party; a former agrarian party slowly turning into a radical right-wing populist party. At least the party is a functional equivalent to such parties elsewhere combining exclusionary nationalism with anti-elitist critique. You would expect parts of the working class to be attracted by this position.

The argument that PP has turned (partly) populist is also mentioned by Ólafur Th. Hardarson and Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson in their piece on "Iceland" in European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook 54: 141–146, 2015:

"The PP did not manage to repeat its victory from the 2013 parliamentary elections at the local level in 2014. However, its result in Reykjavík was noteworthy. In the 2010 local elections, PP obtained 2.7 per cent in Reykjavík and had no member elected to the City Council. Opinion polls before the 2014 elections indicated that the party might again suffer a similar fate in Reykjavík. This changed shortly before the election, when the party's top candidate played a populist anti-Muslim card by claiming her opposition to a planned building of a mosque in the capital. The party ultimately won 10.7 per cent of the vote and had two members elected to the Council. This kind of populism is a new tone in Icelandic politics, which is strongly opposed by all other political parties, as well as many veterans of the PP."

If you're looking at other types of populism too, I would perhaps include Jon Gnarr's Best Party (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Best_Party), which performed very well in in the 2010 city council election in the capital city. I don't know whether Andrej would agree, but to some extent it could be compared to Beppe Grillo's party in Italy.

Good luck with the thesis!

Best regards,
Anders Ravik Jupskås

A.9 Simple three-level interaction models

Table A.9.1: Hypotheses H2, H4 and H8

	Hypothesis H2	Hypothesis H4	Hypothesis H8
	B	B	B
Fixed effects			
Intercept	-0.562*** (0.101)	-0.644*** (0.112)	-0.564*** (0.113)
Social class (ref.: working class)			
Middle class	-0.368*** (0.020)		-0.345*** (0.022)
Top class	-0.484*** (0.020)		-0.493*** (0.016)
Positive party positions on economic liberalization policies	0.097* (0.044)		
Middle class*Positive party positions on economic liberalization policies	0.004 (0.022)		
Outsiders (ref.: insiders)		-0.453*** (0.395)	
Positive party positions on employment protection		-0.030** (0.117)	
Outsiders*Positive party positions on employment protection		0.024** (0.008)	
Strong PRRP in country			0.157 (0.135)
Middle class*Strong PRRP in country			-0.059 (0.033)
Random effects			
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.055	0.057	0.056
Country variance (level-3)	0.163	0.178	0.171
ICC (country-years within countries)	0.064	0.076	0.066
Slope variance (σ^2) of middle class effect (H2)	0.010		
Slope variance (σ^2) of outsiders effect		0.035	
Slope variance (σ^2) of middle class effect (H8)			0.010
-2LL	133601.76	106086.00	139051.35
Wald Chi-Square (df)	865.07 (4)	209.65 (3)	922.43 (4)
Level-2 N	102	102	106
Level-3 N	18	18	18
Total N	112986	101278	117606

Table A.9.2: Hypotheses H6a, H6b and H8c

	Hypothesis H6a	Hypothesis H6b	Hypothesis H6c
	B	B	B
Fixed effects			
Intercept	-0.901*** (0.055)	-0.811*** (0.058)	-0.942*** (0.084)
Positive individual attitudes on immigration	0.050*** (0.008)		
Positive party positions on immigration policies	0.221 (0.309)		
Positive individual attitudes on immigration*Positive party positions on immigration policies	0.026 (0.046)		
Positive individual attitudes on cultural liberalism		0.096***	
Positive party positions on cultural liberalism		-0.201**	
Positive individual attitudes on cultural liberalism*Positive party positions on cultural liberalism		0.113***	
Positive individual attitudes on European integration			0.014
Positive party positions on European integration			0.024
Positive individual attitudes on European integration*Positive party positions on European integration			0.011**
Random effects			
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.271	0.255	0.260
ICC (within country-years)	0.077	0.075	0.074
Slope variance (σ^2) of immigration attitudes effect	0.010		
Slope variance (σ^2) of cultural liberalism attitudes effect		0.013	
Slope variance (σ^2) of European integration attitudes effect			0.003
-2LL	144668.34	145350.82	135837.25
Wald Chi-Square (df)	45.15 (3)	129.38 (3)	42.89 (3)
Level-2 N	102	102	102
Total N	123136	123688	115826

A.10 Three-level interaction models including all micro-level variables

Table A.10.1: Hypotheses H2, H4 and H8

	Hypothesis H2	Hypothesis H4	Hypothesis H8
	B	B	B
Fixed effects			
Intercept	-0.448*** (0.102)	-0.283*** (0.108)	-0.439*** (0.112)
Women (ref: men)	0.001 (0.016)	0.000 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.016)
Age	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (.001)	
Educational level (ref: low)			
Intermediate	-0.228*** (0.022)	-0.225*** (0.022)	-0.229*** (0.021)
High	-0.406*** (0.025)	-0.404*** (0.025)	-0.417*** (0.025)
Social class (ref.: working class)			
Middle class	-0.241*** (0.026)	-0.246*** (0.022)	-0.213*** (0.026)
Top class	-0.305*** (0.022)	-0.306*** (0.022)	-0.312*** (0.022)
Outsiders (ref.: insiders)	-0.257*** (0.020)	-0.362*** (0.040)	-0.258*** (0.020)
Positive attitudes towards:			
Cultural liberalism	0.128*** (0.009)	0.128*** (0.009)	0.123*** (0.009)
European integration	0.045*** (0.004)	0.046*** (0.004)	0.045*** (0.004)
Immigration policies	0.053*** (0.004)	0.053*** (0.004)	0.052*** (0.004)
Welfare policies	0.281*** (0.008)		0.284*** (0.008)
Positive party positions towards economic liberalization policies	0.112* (0.046)		
Middleclass* Positive party positions towards economic liberalization policies	-0.007 (0.024)		
Positive party positions towards employment protection		-0.023* (0.012)	
Outsiders*Positive party positions on employment protection		0.028** (0.008)	
Strong PRRP in country			0.162 (0.139)
Middle class*Strong PRRP in country			-0.087* (0.035)
Random effects			
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.061	0.061	0.062
Country variance (level-3)	0.154	0.153	0.160
ICC (country-years within countries)	0.062	0.069	0.064
Slope variance (σ^2) of middleclass effect (H2)	0.003		
Slope variance (σ^2) of outsiders effect		0.031	

Continuation of table A.10.1

Slope variance (σ^2) of middleclass effect (H8)			0.002
-2LL	101968.84	101577.034	106065.71
Wald Chi-Square (df)	3103.11 (13)	2998.59 (13)	3267.36 (13)
Level-2 N	102	102	106
Level-3 N	18	18	18
Total N	87985	87985	91826

Table A.10.2: Hypotheses H6a, H6b and H6c

	Hypothesis H6a	Hypothesis H6b	Hypothesis H6c
	B	B	B
Fixed effects			
Intercept	-0.405*** (0.100)	-0.356*** (0.100)	-0.436*** (0.111)
Women (ref: men)	0.005 (0.016)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Educational level (ref: low)			
Intermediate	-0.227*** (0.022)	-0.225*** (0.022)	-0.230*** (0.022)
High	-0.411*** (0.025)	-0.404*** (0.025)	-0.410*** (0.025)
Social class (ref.: working class)			
Middle class	-0.242*** (0.022)	-0.244*** (0.022)	-0.241*** (0.022)
Top class	-0.303*** (0.023)	-0.306*** (0.022)	-0.303*** (0.022)
Outsiders (ref.: insiders)	-0.259*** (0.020)	-0.258*** (0.020)	-0.257*** (0.020)
Positive attitudes towards:			
Cultural liberalism	0.132*** (0.009)	0.105*** (0.017)	0.128*** (0.009)
European integration	0.045*** (0.004)	0.046*** (0.004)	0.027** (0.010)
Immigration policies	0.057*** (0.009)	0.053*** (0.004)	0.052*** (0.004)
Welfare policies	0.280*** (0.008)	0.281*** (0.008)	0.280*** (0.008)
Positive party positions on immigration policies	0.231 (0.216)		
Positive individual attitudes on immigration*Positive party positions on immigration policies	0.037 (0.049)		
Positive party positions on cultural liberalism		-0.085 (0.061)	
Positive individual attitudes on cultural liberalism*Positive party positions on cultural liberalism		0.105*** (0.024)	
Positive party positions on European integration			0.021 (0.022)
Positive individual attitudes on European integration*Positive party positions on European integration			0.010* (0.004)
Random effects			
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.065	0.066	0.065
Country variance (level-3)	0.153	0.144	0.151
ICC (country-years within countries)	0.064	0.064	0.062

Continuation of table A.10.2:

Slope variance (σ^2) of immigration attitudes effect	0.010		
Slope variance (σ^2) of cultural liberalism attitudes effect		0.013	
Slope variance (σ^2) of European integration attitudes effect			0.002
-2LL	101432.60	101508.39	101534.59
Wald Chi-Square (df)	3003.37 (13)	3016.26 (13)	3018.19 (13)
Level-2 N	102	102	102
Level-3 N	18	18	18
Total N	87985	87985	87985

A.11 Three-level micro-level logistic regression of attitudes towards European integration

	B	OR	B	OR
Fixed effects				
Intercept	-2.199*** (0.111)	0.111	-2.022*** (0.114)	0.132
Women (ref: men)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.999	0.021 (0.018)	1.021
Age	0.004*** (0.001)	1.004	0.004*** (0.001)	1.004
Educational level (ref: low)				
Intermediate	-0.229*** (0.021)	0.796	-0.222*** (0.024)	0.801
High	-0.417*** (0.025)	0.659	-0.395*** (0.028)	0.674
Social class (ref.: working class)				
Middle class	-0.244*** (0.022)	0.784	-0.252*** (0.025)	0.777
Top class	-0.309*** (0.022)	0.734	-0.315*** (0.025)	0.730
Outsiders (ref.: insiders)	-0.257*** (0.020)	0.774	-0.253*** (0.022)	0.777
Positive attitudes towards:				
Cultural liberalism	0.121*** (0.009)	1.129	0.107*** (0.010)	1.113
Immigration policies	0.052*** (0.004)	1.053	0.059*** (0.004)	1.106
Welfare policies	0.283*** (0.008)	1.328	0.285*** (0.009)	1.330
V1: People's trust in the European parliament	0.045*** (0.004)	1.046		
V2: European unification should go further or has already gone too far			0.002*** (0.001)	1.002
Random effects				
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.074		0.082	
Country variance (level-3)	0.157		0.148	
ICC (country-years within countries)	0.065		0.065	
-2LL	106085.95		81180.202	
Wald Chi-Square (df)	3250.22 (11)		2422.48 (11)	
Level-2 N	106		75	
Level-3 N	18		18	
Total N	91826		69837	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors are noted in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefficients.

A.12 Three-level logistic regression of interaction effects of attitudes towards European integration

	B	OR	B	OR
Fixed effects				
Intercept	-0.436*** (0.111)	0.647	-0.579*** (0.144)	0.561
Women (ref: men)	-0.001 (0.016)	0.999	0.026 (0.015)	1.027
Age	0.004*** (0.001)	1.004	0.004*** (0.001)	1.004
Educational level (ref: low)				
Intermediate	-0.230*** (0.022)	0.794	-0.222*** (0.026)	0.801
High	-0.410*** (0.025)	0.664	-0.397*** (0.029)	0.672
Social class (ref.: working class)				
Middle class	-0.241*** (0.022)	0.786	-0.254*** (0.026)	0.775
Top class	-0.303*** (0.022)	0.739	-0.319*** (0.026)	0.727
Outsiders (ref.: insiders)	-0.257*** (0.020)	0.774	-0.260*** (0.023)	0.771
Positive attitudes towards:				
Cultural liberalism	0.128*** (0.009)	1.136	0.112*** (0.011)	1.112
Immigration policies	0.052*** (0.004)	1.053	0.049*** (0.005)	1.051
Welfare policies	0.280*** (0.008)	1.323	0.283*** (0.009)	1.328
Positive party positions on European integration	0.021 (0.022)	1.022		
V1: People's trust in the European parliament	0.027** (0.010)	1.028		
V2: European unification should go further or has already gone too far			-0.024 (0.032)	0.976
V1/V2* Positive party positions on European integration	0.010* (0.004)	1.010	0.017*** (0.004)	1.017
Random effects				
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.065		0.065	
Country variance (level-3)	0.151		0.235	
ICC (country-years within countries)	0.062		0.084	
Slope variance (σ^2) of European integration attitudes effect	0.002		0.003	
-2LL	101534.59		74038.13	
Wald Chi-Square (df)	3018.19 (13)		2215.56 (13)	
Level-2 N	102		18	
Level-3 N	18		71	
Total N	87985		64028	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors are noted in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefficients.

A.13 Three-level micro-level logistic regression of attitudes towards immigration policies

	Model 2		Model 9	
	B	OR	B	OR
Fixed effects				
Intercept	-2.199*** (0.111)	0.111	-2.235*** (0.113)	0.107
Women (ref: men)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.999	-0.007 (0.016)	0.993
Age	0.004*** (0.001)	1.004	0.004*** (0.0010	1.004
Educational level (ref: low)				
Intermediate	-0.229*** (0.021)	0.796	-0.234*** (0.021)	0.791
High	-0.417*** (0.025)	0.659	-0.433*** (0.025)	0.649
Social class (ref.: working class)				
Middle class	-0.244*** (0.022)	0.784	-0.247*** (0.022)	0.781
Top class	-0.309*** (0.022)	0.734	-0.320*** (0.022)	0.726
Outsiders (ref.: insiders)	-0.257*** (0.020)	0.774	-0.258*** (0.020)	0.773
Positive attitudes towards:				
Cultural liberalism	0.121*** (0.009)	1.129	0.110*** (0.009)	1.116
European integration	0.045*** (0.004)	1.046	0.045*** (0.004)	1.046
Welfare policies	0.283*** (0.008)	1.328	0.281*** (0.008)	1.325
V1: Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	0.052*** (0.004)	1.053		
V2: Country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants			0.060*** (0.004)	1.062
Random effects				
Country-year variance (level-2)	0.074			
Country variance (level-3)	0.157			
ICC (country-years within countries)	0.065			
-2LL	106085.95		106135,80	
Wald Chi-Square (df)	3250.22 (11)		3321.94 (11)	
Level-2 N	106		106	
Level-3 N	18		17	
Total N	91826		91964	

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors are noted in parentheses next to the unstandardized coefficients.